

Game Theory with Applications to Finance and Marketing

Lecture 2: Multistage Games with Observable Actions and Repeated Games

1. A multistage game is an extensive game where the game tree can be naturally divided into stages $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$. A multistage game with observable actions is a multistage game where at the beginning of any stage t , all the actions taken by the players in earlier stages are common knowledge. A special class of multistage games with observable actions are *repeated games*, in which a stage game is repeated for a finite or infinite number of times. Our agenda here is as follows. In Part I, we shall analyze two special multistage games with observable actions with an infinite time horizon, one being Rubinstein's (1982) infinite-horizon bargaining game and the other the war of attrition. There does not exist a "last period" in these games, and hence the backward induction technique that we learned in Lecture 1 cannot be used to solve for the SPNE of such games. We shall demonstrate a procedure to solve such games. Then in Part II, we shall consider infinitely repeated games, and introduce the folk theorems that have been used to solve such games, which require understanding of such concepts as minmax strategy, trigger strategy, and so on. We shall then apply the theory to collusive pricing of imperfectly competitive firms and to strategic cooperation between upstream and downstream firms in a distribution channel. We shall also apply the theory to study the role of forward transactions in changing imperfectly competitive firms' profits. Then in Part III, we consider finitely repeated games, and introduce a new equilibrium concept called *renegotiation-proof equilibrium*. We shall demonstrate the ideas using a series of examples. Finally, in Part IV, we consider a series of multistage games with observable actions in corporate finance. Issues to be examined include bank runs, corporate agency problems, strategic default of debt, and so on.
2. **Part I.**
3. **(Rubinstein's Bargaining Game)** Consider Rubinstein's (1982) bargaining model with alternating offers. Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over 1 dollar. In period i , where i is odd, player 1 can make an offer

$(x_i, 1 - x_i)$ to player 2, where x_i is player 1's share, and player 2 can either accept or reject that offer. If the offer is accepted, then the dollar is so divided; or else, the game moves on to the $i + 1$ st period. In period j , where j is even, player 2 can make an offer $(x_j, 1 - x_j)$ to player 1, where x_j is again player 1's share, and player 1 can either accept or reject that offer. The game ends here if acceptance is player 1's decision (with the dollar divided as player 2 proposed); or else, the game moves on to the $j + 1$ st period. If an offer $(x, 1 - x)$ is accepted in period i , then player 1's payoff is $\delta_1^{i-1}x$ and player 2's payoff is $\delta_2^{i-1}(1 - x)$, where the discount factors $\delta_1, \delta_2 \in (0, 1)$.

Shaked and Sutton (1984) prove that there is a unique SPNE of this infinite-horizon game. At the beginning of period i where i is odd and no consensus has been reached, the subgame looks exactly the same as at period 1. This is referred to as the *stationarity* property. Because of this property, we know that the set of SPNE's in the subgame starting at the beginning of period i where i is odd and no consensus has been reached is the same as the set of SPNE's of the entire extensive game. Let \underline{v}_i and \bar{v}_i be the infimum and supremum of player i 's continuation payoffs in any SPNE of a subgame starting at a period where it is player i 's turn to make an offer. Let \underline{w}_i and \bar{w}_i be the infimum and supremum of player i 's continuation payoffs in any SPNE of a subgame starting at a period where it is player j 's turn to make an offer.¹ Then in any SPNE, player j cannot reject an immediate offer from i that gives player j a share greater than $\delta_j \bar{v}_j$, proving that²

$$\underline{v}_i \geq 1 - \delta_j \bar{v}_j.$$

¹The set of SPNE payoffs for player i in the subgame where consensus has never been reached and player i is about to make an offer is bounded above by 1 and below by zero. This set is nonempty so long as this game has at least one SPNE. A non-empty subset of \Re that is bounded above must have a lowest upper bound (the supremum), and a non-empty subset of \Re that is bounded below must have a greatest lower bound (the infimum).

²Note that by promising player j the payoff $\delta_j \bar{v}_j$ player i can get the payoff $1 - \delta_j \bar{v}_j$ immediately. In any SPNE of the subgame where it is player i 's turn to make an offer, player i 's equilibrium payoff must be greater than or equal to this "feasible" payoff; that is, $1 - \delta_j \bar{v}_j$ is a lower bound for the set of SPNE payoffs that player i can get in a subgame where it is player i 's turn to make an offer. Since \underline{v}_i is the maximum of all such lower bounds, the following inequality must hold.

This also implies that player i when making offers to player j will not promise player j a share greater than $\delta_j \bar{v}_j$, and hence

$$\bar{w}_j \leq \delta_j \bar{v}_j.$$

On the other hand, player j will definitely reject an offer from player i that promises a share to player j less than $\delta_j \underline{v}_j$. That is, when player i is the one making an offer, he cannot get more than $1 - \delta_j \underline{v}_j$ when his offer gets accepted. Recall that if player j rejects player i 's offer in this period and the game moves on to the next period, then player i 's payoff in the subgame starting from the next period cannot exceed \bar{w}_i . Now, in a subgame where no consensus has been reached and player i is about to make an offer to player j , player i either gets nothing in equilibrium (if the two players will never reach a consensus in this subgame), or player i 's equilibrium payoff is positive because player i will ultimately make an offer that is accepted by player j (and in this event player i 's payoff is maximized when that offer is made in the first period of the current subgame), or player i 's equilibrium payoff is positive because player i will ultimately accept an offer made by player j (and in that event player i 's payoff is maximized when that offer is made in the second period of the current subgame). Thus we conclude that

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{v}_i &\leq \max(1 - \delta_j \underline{v}_j, \delta_i \bar{w}_i) \\ &\leq \max(1 - \delta_j \underline{v}_j, \delta_i^2 \bar{v}_i), \end{aligned}$$

implying that the last maximum equals $1 - \delta_j \underline{v}_j$. (Why?) It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{v}_i &\leq 1 - \delta_j \underline{v}_j \leq 1 - \delta_j (1 - \delta_i \bar{v}_i) \\ &\Rightarrow \bar{v}_i \leq \frac{1 - \delta_j}{1 - \delta_i \delta_j}. \end{aligned}$$

It also follows that

$$\underline{v}_i \geq 1 - \delta_j \bar{v}_j \geq 1 - \delta_j (1 - \delta_i \underline{v}_i)$$

$$\Rightarrow v_i \geq \frac{1 - \delta_j}{1 - \delta_i \delta_j}.$$

This implies that

$$v_i \equiv \bar{v}_i = \underline{v}_i = \frac{1 - \delta_j}{1 - \delta_i \delta_j},$$

so that all SPNE's must generate the same payoff profile. We have $1 - v_j = \delta_i v_i$, and hence $1 - \delta_j v_j \geq \delta_i^2 \bar{v}_i$. Now the two players must reach consensus at period 1 in the unique SPNE: player 1 must offer $x_1 = \underline{v}_1$, which player 2 feels indifferent about accepting or rejecting but chooses to accept with probability one. (When $\delta_i = \delta_j$, we have $v_i = v_j$; compare this result with section 53 of Lecture 1, Part I.)

4. Here is another proof for the uniqueness of SPNE's in Rubinstein's bargaining game. Note that when making offers to player j , player i knows that player j will never accept a negative share, and player j will accept any share greater than δ_j . It follows that player i will not offer a share greater than δ_j , and player j will reject any share less than $\delta_j(1 - \delta_i)$. Repeating this argument, we now claim that if for some $k \in \mathbf{Z}_+$, player 1 accepts any share $x > x^k$ and player 2 accepts any share $x < y^k$, with $y^k < x^k$, (so that player 1 will never offer $x < y^k$ and will reject any $x < \delta_1 y^k$, and player 2 will never offer $x > x^k$ and will reject any $x > 1 - \delta_2(1 - x^k)$), then player 1 must accept any $x > x^{k+1} = \delta_1(1 - \delta_2) + \delta_1 \delta_2 x^k$, and player 2 must accept any $x < y^{k+1} = 1 - \delta_2 + \delta_1 \delta_2 y^k$.³

To see this, note that if player 1 rejects player 2's offer in some subgame, then one of three things may happen. Either (i) no agreement will ever

³Note that $x^1 = \delta_1$ and $y^1 = 1 - \delta_2$. Note also that $x^{k+1} - x^k = \delta_1 \delta_2 (x^k - x^{k-1})$, and hence $\{x^k\}$ is a monotone sequence. To figure out whether $\{x^k\}$ is monotone increasing or monotone decreasing, we simply check

$$x^{k+1} - x^k = -\delta_1 \delta_2 (1 - x^k) \leq 0.$$

Similarly, note that $y^{k+1} - y^k = \delta_1 \delta_2 (y^k - y^{k-1})$ and $y^{k+1} - y^1 = \delta_1 \delta_2 y^k \geq 0$. Thus $\{x^k\}$ and $\{y^k\}$ are respectively decreasing and increasing sequences contained in the compact interval $[0, 1]$, and hence they both have limits, which we denote by x^∞ and y^∞ respectively. Since $x^\infty < y^\infty$, it is incorrect to assert that $x^{k+1} > y^{k+1}$ for all k even if it is true that $x^1 > y^1$ (or if, equivalently, $1 < \delta_1 + \delta_2$). The latter error appears on page 130 of Fudenberg and Tirole's book, *Game Theory*, MIT Press.

be reached, and player 1 gets 0; or (ii) player 2 accepts one of player 1's offers, which allows player 1 to get a payoff no greater than $x^{k+1} = \delta_1[1 - \delta_2(1 - x^k)]$ (since player 2 would reject any $x > 1 - \delta_2(1 - x^k)$); or (iii) player 1 accepts one of player 2's offers, which yields a payoff for player 1 that is at most $\delta_1^2 x^k$ (since player 2 would never offer $x > x^k$). The payoff in (ii) is the highest among the 3 possibilities.⁴ Thus player 1 should accept any share $x > x^{k+1}$. The reasoning for player 2's behavior is similar.

Now $x^{k+1} - x^k = (1 - \delta_1\delta_2)(1 - x^k) - (1 - \delta_1) < 0$, and similarly $y^{k+1} - y^k > 0$, by the axiom of continuity in \mathfrak{R} , the two monotone sequences $\{x^k; k \in \mathbf{Z}_+\}$ and $\{y^k; k \in \mathbf{Z}_+\}$ are contained in $[0, 1]$ and have limits $x^\infty = \frac{\delta_1(1-\delta_2)}{1-\delta_1\delta_2}$ and $y^\infty = \frac{1-\delta_2}{1-\delta_1\delta_2}$ respectively. Since player 2 rejects any $x > y^\infty$ and accepts any $x < y^\infty$, it is the unique SPNE outcome that player 1 offers y^∞ to player 2 in period 1, which player 2 accepts with probability one.

Here the unique SPNE result depends crucially on the facts that there are only two players engaging in bargaining and that the players can offer any number contained in the unit interval. When there are more than two players, or when the set of feasible offers is finite, there tend to be multiple equilibria for this infinite-horizon bargaining game.

Example 0. Let us modify the game by assuming that the offers must be in multiples of 0.01. Suppose that both players have a common discount factor δ . Show that if $\delta = \frac{1}{2}$ then there are two pure-strategy SPNEs, and if δ is very close to 1 (say $\delta > 0.99$) then associated with each $x \in \{0, 0.01, 0.02, \dots, 0.99, 1\}$ there is an SPNE where player 1 starts by offering x at date 1 and player 2 accepts it right away.^{5 6}

⁴Note that, because $\delta_1 < 1$ and $x^k \leq 1$,

$$\delta_1[1 - \delta_2(1 - x^k)] - \delta_1^2 x^k = \delta_1[(1 - \delta_2) - (\delta_1 - \delta_2)x^k] > 0.$$

⁵The game may also have multiple equilibria when there are more than two players participating in the bargaining; see exercise 4.9 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Game Theory).

⁶That replacing a continuum strategy space by a discrete strategy space may result in multiple equilibria should not be surprising. In a Bertrand duopoly where two firms with zero costs are competing for the patronage of a buyer with unit demand, there is a

Solution. If player 2 never offers $x > x^k$ because player 1 cannot resist accepting x^k , then player 2 will reject any offer $x > 1 - \delta(1 - x^k)$ made by player 1. (Recall that x indicates player 1's share of the dollar.) Thus player 1's payoff upon rejecting player 2's offer is at most

$$\delta[1 - \delta(1 - x^k)],$$

which implies that when player 2 offers $\delta[1 - \delta(1 - x^k)]$ to player 1, player 1 had better accept it right away, implying in turn that player 2 would never offer

$$x > x^{k+1} = \{\delta[1 - \delta(1 - x^k)] + 0.01\},$$

where $\{z\}$ is the quantity that we would obtain by rounding z downward to the nearest 0.01.

Similarly, if player 1 never offers $x < y^k$ because player 2 would accept any offer less than or equal to y^k , then player 1 will reject any offer $x < \delta y^k$ made by player 2. Thus upon rejecting player 1's offer player 2 expects to get no more than $\delta(1 - \delta y^k)$, and hence player 2 cannot reject an offer of $\delta(1 - \delta y^k)$ made by player 1, implying that player 1 never offers

$$x < y^{k+1} = \{1 - \delta(1 - \delta y^k) - 0.01\}.$$

Now, suppose $\delta = \frac{1}{2}$, and let $x^0 = 1$ and $y^0 = 1$ (observe that player 2 never offers $x > 1$ and player 1 never offers $x < 0$). We have

$$x^1 = 0.51, \quad x^2 = 0.38, \quad x^3 = 0.35, \quad x^k = 0.34, \quad \forall k \geq 4;$$

and

$$y^1 = 0.49, \quad y^2 = 0.62, \quad y^3 = 0.65, \quad y^k = 0.66, \quad \forall k \geq 4.$$

Thus in an SPNE player 1 never offers $x < 0.66$ and always rejects $x < 0.33$; and player 2 never offers $x > 0.34$ and always rejects $x > 0.67$.

unique Nash equilibrium where both firms price at zero. Suppose now that prices must be in multiples of 0.01, and the buyer's willingness to pay $v > 0.01$. Apparently it is an equilibrium where both firms price at zero, but observe that it is also an equilibrium where both firms price at 0.01. Price discreteness has been used to explain the market makers' collusive behavior found in the Nasdaq dealership market; see Anshuman and Kalay (1998, *Market Making with Discrete Prices*, *Review of Financial Studies*).

There are thus two SPNEs. In one SPNE, player 1 offers $x = 0.66$ which is accepted by player 2 right away. (If player 1 deviates and offers more than 0.66 then player 2 would reject the offer and make a counter offer of 0.33, which player 1 must accept.) In the other SPNE, player 1 offers $x = 0.67$, which is accepted by player 2 right away. (If player 2 deviates and rejects the offer, then player 1 would reject any counter offer less than or equal 0.33.)

There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium where player 1 randomizes between 0.66 and 0.67, and player 2 accepts 0.66 with probability one but rejects 0.67 with probability $\frac{1}{67}$.

Now, the same procedure that we took above to deal with the case of $\delta = \frac{1}{2}$ can be used to show that if $\delta > 0.99$ then $x^k = 1$ and $y^k = 0$ for all $k \geq 1$, implying that every $x \in \{0, 0.01, 0.02, \dots, 0.99, 1\}$ is an equilibrium outcome.

5. (**War of Attrition**) Consider the following timing game, called the *war of attrition* (Maynard Smith, 1974). Two animals are fighting for a prey, which they both attach value $v > 1$. The current time is $t = 0$, and time is discrete. Fighting costs 1 per date. If one animal gives up fighting at date t , the other animal gets the prey without incurring the fighting cost at that date. If both stop fighting at date t , both get zero. The two animals have common discount factor $\delta \in (0, 1)$.

Thus this is a timing game, where players must decide when to make a move.⁷ (Here, the move is to give up fighting and leave.) Denote the payoff of the animal that stops first by $L(t)$, where

$$L(t) = -(1 + \delta + \delta^2 + \dots + \delta^{t-1}) = -\frac{1 - \delta^t}{1 - \delta},$$

and the payoff of the animal that does not stop first by $F(t)$, where⁸

⁷Another important class of timing games is the *preemption games*, in which the first player that makes a move wins, in contrast with the current *war of attrition*, in which the first player that makes the move loses. For example, there are two firms considering entering a new market, and neither entered before t but one of them enters exactly at t . In this case the entering firm gets a time- t payoff $g > 0$ and the other gets zero. If both enter at t , then both get $l < 0$ at t .

⁸Waiting for one more period does not automatically raise the waiting cost by one; it does if and only if the rival is also waiting at the same time.

$$F(t) = L(t) + \delta^t v.$$

Note that both animals have payoff $L(t)$ if they both stop fighting at date t . Among the SPNE's of this game, there is a unique symmetric *stationary* one, where each player chooses to stop right away with a probability p if the rival is still present.⁹ For this to be a symmetric equilibrium, p must satisfy

$$pF(t) + (1 - p)L(t + 1) = L(t),$$

where the right-hand side is the payoff generated by “stop immediately,” and the left-hand side the payoff generated by “stop at the next date unless the rival is no longer present the next date.” Solving, we have $p = \frac{1}{1+v}$. Note that in this equilibrium, both players have zero payoff.

The continuous-time counterpart of this game (where δ^t is replaced by e^{-rt} , the distribution function of the exit time t is denoted by $G(t)$, and fighting costs Δt for any time interval with length Δt) also has a symmetric SPNE. For $G(\cdot)$ to define a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, it must be that given both firms stay up to time t , each firm feels indifferent about quitting right away or staying for dt longer. That is, by incurring a cost $-dt$, one gets v in the next instant with probability $\frac{G(t+dt) - G(t)}{1 - G(t)}$, and this must yield a zero incremental payoff for the firm:

$$vdG(t) - [1 - G(t)]dt = 0.$$

It follows that

$$G'(t) = \frac{dG(t)}{dt} = \frac{1 - G(t)}{v}.$$

⁹Usually, the players' temporal equilibrium behavior in an SPNE may depend both on t and on the history at time t . We call such an SPNE a closed-loop or feedback SPNE. (Here, in the war of attrition, if we let ϕ_t represent the set of players who did not exit before time t , and the history at time t can be represented by $\{\phi_s; s \in [0, t]\}$.) If the players' temporal equilibrium behavior depends only on t , then the SPNE is an open-loop equilibrium. If the players' temporal equilibrium behavior depends only on ϕ_t , then the SPNE is stationary.

It follows that

$$G(t) = 1 - ce^{-\frac{t}{v}},$$

for some constant c . Note that $G(0) > 1$ if $c < 0$, and $G(0) < 0$ if $c > 1$. Thus $c \in [0, 1]$. If $c < 1$, then $G(0) > 0$. Hence a firm can get essentially $G(0)v > 0$ by exiting right after time 0, implying that it should not exit at time 0 with a strictly positive probability. To be consistent with a symmetric SPNE, we must have $c = 1$. Thus in the unique symmetric SPNE, we have

$$G(t) = 1 - e^{-\frac{t}{v}}.$$

6. Part II.

7. (**Repeated Games**) A repeated game is a supergame of some stage (or constituent) game, and it takes the simple form of repeating the stage game for either a finite or an infinite number of times. Let the stage game in normal form be

$$G(1) = \{(A_i)_{i=1}^I, (u_i)_{i=1}^I\},$$

where I is the number of players, A_i the set of feasible actions available to player i in $G(1)$, and $u_i : \Pi_{i=1}^I A_i \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$ player i 's (current) payoff in $G(1)$. The set $A = \Pi_{i=1}^I A_i$ is the set of *action profiles* at each stage t . We shall enlarge players' action spaces by allowing them to use any correlated device on A . If a device Ω is adopted, and if at stage τ , ω^τ is the outcome of the device, we call the sequence

$$h^t \equiv \{\omega^0, \omega^1, \dots, \omega^{t-1}; a^0, a^1, \dots, a^{t-1}\}, \forall t \in \mathbf{Z}_+ \cup \{0\}$$

the *history* of the game at the beginning of stage t . (The notation \mathbf{Z}_+ stands for the set of strictly positive integers.) A pure strategy s_i for player i is a sequence of mappings $\{s_i^t : h^t \rightarrow A, \forall t\}$. Let S_i be the set of all pure strategies and Σ_i the set of all mixed strategies for player i .

Now, denote $G(T)$ the supergame of $G(1)$ that would result if we repeat $G(1)$ for T times, with player i 's payoff being given by

$$\frac{1 - \delta}{1 - \delta^{T+1}} \sum_{t=0}^T \delta^t u_i(a^t),$$

where a^t is the action profile chosen by the players at stage t and $\delta \in (0, 1]$ the players' common discount factor (in general players can have different discount factors δ_i). In this case, s_i is a sequence containing T terms of s_i^t .

Let $G(\infty)$ be the supergame of $G(1)$ that will result if we repeat $G(1)$ for a countably infinite number of times. Correspondingly, the payoff function of player i in $G(\infty)$ is¹⁰

$$(1 - \delta) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t u_i(a^t).$$

Note that this payoff function has already been normalized so that it is readily comparable with the payoff function in $G(1)$: observe simply that $(1 - \delta) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t = 1$. In this case, s_i is an infinite sequence of s_i^t . Given $G(\infty)$, the following is called the *continuation payoff* at stage t :

$$(1 - \delta) \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \delta^{\tau-t} u_i(a^\tau).$$

Note that when players choose actions at stage t , all the current-stage payoffs in the earlier stages are sunk, and only the *continuation payoffs* will affect their choices of actions at stage t .

8. Define V as the set of feasible payoff profiles that the players may attain by taking some action profiles in $G(1)$. Depending on our assumption about what the players can do in $G(1)$, V may or may not be a convex set. (Recall that $A \subset \mathfrak{R}^n$ is convex if the line segment connecting any two points in A is also contained in A .) For example, if the players are confined to using mixed strategies only, then this set is in general non-convex.¹¹ At the other extreme where the players can collectively choose *any* correlated device (not necessarily a correlated equilibrium), which randomly selects elements in A , then it is easy to see that V is convex. For example, consider the following $G(1)$:

¹⁰Game theorists also consider other payoff functions. For example, the *time-average* payoff function takes the form of $\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_i(s^t)$ in $G(T)$ and $\underline{\lim}_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_i(s^t)$ in $G(\infty)$. Recall that if $\{x_t; t \in \mathbf{Z}_+\}$ is a real sequence, then $\underline{\lim}_{t \rightarrow \infty} x_t = \sup_{t \in \mathbf{Z}_+} \inf_{s \geq t} x_s$ always exists in the extended real line $\overline{\mathfrak{R}}$.

¹¹Exceptions exist. For example, in a two player finite game where player 1 has only one feasible action, the set V is convex.

| Player 1/Player 2 | L | R |
|-------------------|------|------|
| U | 5, 1 | 0, 0 |
| D | 4, 4 | 1, 5 |

where a correlated device assigning (U,L), (U,R), (D,L), and (D,R) with respectively probability a , b , c , and d will generate a payoff profile

$$\begin{aligned} & \begin{pmatrix} 5 \cdot a + 0 \cdot b + 4 \cdot c + 1 \cdot d \\ 1 \cdot a + 0 \cdot b + 4 \cdot c + 5 \cdot d \end{pmatrix} \\ &= a \begin{pmatrix} 5 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} + b \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} + c \begin{pmatrix} 4 \\ 4 \end{pmatrix} + d \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 5 \end{pmatrix}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus if we allow the two players to adopt any correlated device from

$$\mathcal{C} = \{(a, b, c, d) : a + b + c + d = 1, a, b, c, d \geq 0\},$$

then the set of payoff profiles attainable by the two players is a convex set, which is exactly the convex hull generated by the four vectors

$$\begin{pmatrix} 5 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 4 \\ 4 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 5 \end{pmatrix}.$$

In the following, we shall mostly assume that V is convex.¹² Any payoff profile in V will be referred to as *feasible*.

9. **(Minmax Value and Individually Rational Payoff)** Given $G(1)$, define player i 's *minmax value* or *reservation utility* as

$$\underline{v}_i \equiv \min_{\sigma_{-i} \in \Sigma_{-i}} [\max_{\sigma_i \in \Sigma_i} u_i(\sigma)],$$

where in this section only, σ denotes a mixed strategy profile in the game $G(1)$. Define *minmax strategy profiles against player i* by the following

¹²Even if the players cannot freely commit to any correlated device that they like, *intertemporal switching* may lead to approximately the same result if δ is close to 1. For example, imagine that in $G(\infty)$, for all $n \in \mathbf{Z}_+$ and at all stage $10(n-1) + t$, the two players will play (U,L) if $t = 1, 2, 3$, (U,R) if $t = 4, 5, 6, 7$, (D,L) if $t = 8, 9$, and (D,R) if $t = 10$. This will generate an average (per-period) payoff profile close to that generated by a correlated device with $a = 0.3$, $b = 0.4$, $c = 0.2$, and $d = 0.1$.

$$m_{-i}^i \in \arg \min_{\sigma_{-i} \in \Sigma_{-i}} [\max_{\sigma_i \in \Sigma_i} u_i(\sigma)].$$

Define

$$m_i^i \in \arg \max_{\sigma_i \in \Sigma_i} u_i(\sigma_i, m_{-i}^i).$$

With these notations, of course, we have


$$\underline{v}_i = u_i(m_i^i, m_{-i}^i).$$

As an example, consider the following stage game $G(1)$:

| | | |
|-------------------|-------|-------|
| player 1/player 2 | L | R |
| U | -2, 2 | 1, -2 |
| M | 1, -2 | -2, 2 |
| D | 0, 1 | 0, 1 |

Let us find \underline{v}_1 . If q is the probability that player 2 may play L in $G(1)$, then m_2^1 is the q that minimizes

$$\max(u_1(U, q), u_1(M, q), u_1(D, q)) = \max(1 - 3q, 3q - 2, 0),$$



so that we have $m_2^1 = [\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}]$, and

$$v_1 = u_1(D, m_2^1) = 0.$$

Similarly, to determine v_2 , let p_U and p_M be the probabilities that player 1 may play U and M respectively, and we have

$$v_2 = \min_{p_U, p_M} [\max(2(p_U - p_M) + (1 - p_U - p_M), -2(p_U - p_M) + (1 - p_U - p_M))].$$

10. Recall Example 1 in Lecture 1, Part I. Let us assume that $F = c = 0$. Given $q_i \in [0, 1]$, $i = 1, 2$, the equilibrium price for the product is $1 - q_1 - q_2$, so that

$$\arg \max_{q_i} q_i(1 - q_i - q_j) = \frac{1 - q_j}{2},$$

and

$$u_i\left(\frac{1 - q_j}{2}, q_j\right) = \frac{(1 - q_j)^2}{4},$$

which implies that

$$m_j^i = \arg \min_{q_j} \frac{(1 - q_j)^2}{4} = 1, \quad m_i^i = \frac{1 - m_j^i}{2} = 0,$$

and

$$\underline{v}_i = u_i(m_i^i, m_j^i) = 0, \quad i = 1, 2.$$

11. Note that in any SPNE of $G(\infty)$, player i 's equilibrium payoff can not be lower than \underline{v}_i , since player i can always take a best response against the other players' actions in each and every period! Thus, define accordingly

$$V^* = \{v \in V : v_i > \underline{v}_i, \forall i = 1, 2, \dots, I\},$$


and payoff profiles in V^* will be referred to as *feasible and individually rational*.^{13 14}

12. (**One-stage Deviation Principle**) To check if a conjectured profile σ is an SPNE of a repeated game, one would presumably need to check if, from each player' perspective, any (complex) unilateral deviations can improve upon σ . The following theorem, however, asserts that verifying the simplest form of unilateral deviations will suffice.¹⁵

¹³The minmax strategy is typically a mixed strategy. Since a player's minmax value is what she can get in $G(1)$ when she uses her best response against her rivals' joint minmax strategies, and since a player's payoff in a Nash equilibrium of $G(1)$ is what she can get in $G(1)$ when she uses her best response against her rivals' equilibrium strategies, we conclude that a player's equilibrium payoff in $G(1)$ is always greater than or equal to her minmax value.

¹⁴What if players are restricted to using only pure strategies? Note that if a penalized player's best response against the other players' joint minmax strategy is a mixed strategy, then there exists an equally good pure-strategy best response for the penalized player. Hence restricting the players to use only pure strategies only restricts the set of feasible penalizing strategies, and hence it weakly raises the minmax value for each player.

¹⁵Theorem 1 actually applies to all multi-stage games with observable actions.



Theorem 1. (One-stage Deviation Principle)

- (a) A pure strategy profile s is a subgame perfect NE for $G(T)$ if and only if no player i can at any stage t benefit from a unilateral deviation s'_i that differs from his equilibrium strategy s_i only in the stage- t mapping s_i^t .
- (b) If $G(\infty)$ is *continuous at infinity* in the sense that for all i ,

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{h, h' \text{ s.t. } h^t = [h']^t} |u_i(h) - u_i(h')| = 0,$$

then a pure strategy profile s is a subgame perfect NE for $G(\infty)$ if and only if no player i can at any stage t benefit from a unilateral deviation s'_i that differs from his equilibrium strategy s_i only in the stage- t mapping s_i^t .

Proof. Consider assertion (a). Necessity is definitional. To check sufficiency, suppose instead that for some player i , for some t and h^t ,

there exists \hat{s}_i better than s_i in the subgame starting at h^t . Let \hat{t} be the largest t' such that for some $h^{t'}$, $\hat{s}_i(h^{t'}) \neq s_i(h^{t'})$. Apparently, $\hat{t} > t$: otherwise, at t and h^t , \hat{s}_i relative to s_i is simply a one-stage deviation, and we have assumed that no one-stage deviation can improve upon s_i !

Define \tilde{s}_i as such that it coincides with \hat{s}_i at all $\tau < \hat{t}$, and it coincides with s_i from stage \hat{t} on. At \hat{t} , \hat{s}_i is a one-stage deviation relative to s_i , and since we have assumed that no one-stage deviation can improve upon s_i , we conclude that \tilde{s}_i is a weakly better response than \hat{s}_i in every subgame starting at stage \hat{t} . Since \tilde{s}_i coincides with \hat{s}_i at all $t < \hat{t}$, we conclude that \tilde{s}_i is also a weakly better response than \hat{s}_i starting at stage t with history h^t . Now if $\hat{t} = t + 1$, then at t given history h^t , \tilde{s}_i becomes a one-stage deviation relative to s_i , but we have assumed that such a deviation cannot improve upon s_i . This contradicts the assumption that \hat{s}_i , which is a weakly worse response than \tilde{s}_i , can improve upon s_i at t given history h^t .

It remains to discuss the case where $\hat{t} > t + 1$. In this case, we can move the spot light from \hat{s}_i to \tilde{s}_i , and find a strategy $s_i^{(1)}$ that coincides with \tilde{s}_i at all $\tau < \hat{t} - 1$ and coincides with s_i from stage $\hat{t} - 1$ on. The same reasoning as above shows that $s_i^{(1)}$ is a weakly better response than \tilde{s}_i , and hence a weakly better response than \hat{s}_i at t given history h^t . Either $\hat{t} - 1 = t + 1$, in that case we shall obtain a contradiction, or we can move the spot light from \tilde{s}_i to $s_i^{(1)}$, and find a strategy $s_i^{(2)}$ that coincides with $s_i^{(1)}$ at all $\tau < \hat{t} - 2$ and coincides with s_i from stage $\hat{t} - 2$ on. Repeating this argument, we can ultimately show that \hat{s}_i is a weakly worse response than some $s_i^{(k)}$, and yet $s_i^{(k)}$ is a one-stage deviation at t given history h^t , which by assumption cannot improve upon s_i at t given history h^t , thereby establishing a contradiction. This completes the proof for sufficiency in assertion (a).

Next, consider assertion (b). From the proof to assertion (a), if s satisfies the one-stage deviation condition, then it cannot be improved by any finite sequence of deviations in any subgame. Suppose instead that for some player i , for some t and h^t , there exists \hat{s}_i better than s_i in the subgame starting at h^t . Let $\epsilon > 0$ be the amount of extra payoff brought about by the improved strategy \hat{s}_i . Continuity at infinity implies that there exists T such that the strategy \tilde{s}_i that coincides with \hat{s}_i before T and coincides with s_i from stage T on must improve on s_i

by at least $\frac{\epsilon}{2} > 0$, which contradicts the fact that no finite sequence of deviations can make any improvement on s_i at all.

13. **(Infinitely Repeated Games.)** We shall first focus on infinitely repeated games. How is Theorem 1 helpful? Note that if for all $i = 1, 2, \dots, I$, $u_i(\cdot)$ is bounded, which will be true if A is a finite set or if $u_i(\cdot)$ is continuous and A is a compact subset of some finite-dimensional Euclidean space, then with the payoff function $(1 - \delta) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t u_i(a^t)$, $G(\infty)$ is continuous at infinity. In this case, Theorem 1 is always applicable.
14. **Theorem 2.** (Nash Folk Theorem) Every feasible and individually rational payoff profile (i.e. every element of V^*) can be sustained as an NE payoff profile in $G(\infty)$ as long as δ is sufficiently close to 1.

The idea is that when some deviation occurs, the deviator will keep receiving his minmax payoff, starting from the very stage after the deviation is detected. In other words, the deviator is penalized forever if he once deviated from an implicitly agreed upon profile in V^* . The problem with this penalizing scheme is that it is generally not subgame perfect, since minmaxing the opponent and expecting the opponent to make a best response does not constitute an SPNE in general. In other words, the threat to penalize the deviator may not be credible. This motivates Friedman's perfect Folk Theorem.¹⁶

15. Recall Example 1, Lecture 1, Part I, and let us assume $F = c = 0$. Theorem 2 implies that there exists a Nash equilibrium for $G(\infty)$ in which both firms produce $\frac{1}{4}$ in each and every period as long as δ is sufficiently close to 1. In each period, firm i 's current payoff is $\frac{1}{8} > 0$, and if it deviates and produces at $\frac{1-\frac{1}{4}}{2} = \frac{3}{8}$, it would gain immediately by $\frac{3}{8}(1 - \frac{3}{8} - \frac{1}{4}) - \frac{1}{8} = \frac{1}{64} > 0$, but from the next period on, its rival would minmax it in each and every period, causing it to lose a total of

$$\frac{1}{8}(\delta + \delta^2 + \delta^3 + \dots) = \frac{\delta}{8(1 - \delta)},$$

¹⁶We did not claim that there exist feasible and individually rational payoff profiles that cannot be sustained as an SPNE payoff profile in $G(\infty)$ even when δ is close to 1. We only pointed out that such a payoff profile may not be sustained by the naive minmax threat. In fact, when $I = 2$, the assertion in Theorem 2 is *correct*, but we need to design another penalizing scheme, and make sure that the scheme is itself an SPNE.

and hence firm i has no incentive to deviate given firm j 's strategy, if and only if

$$\delta \geq \frac{1}{9}.$$

The problem with this argument is that, after firm i did deviate and produce $\frac{3}{8}$, firm j has no incentive to carry out the retaliation and min-max firm i . Indeed, firm j would obtain zero payoff itself in each period that it minmaxes firm i , and firm j could instead obtain the monopoly profit given that firm i would produce $m_i^i = 0$ units! However, knowing that firm j has no intention to really carry out the retaliation, firm i would indeed like to deviate, but then the asserted equilibrium would break down.

16. To continue, we claim that in the preceding example, it is an SPNE for $G(\infty)$ that both firms produce $\frac{1}{3}$ units in each and every period. That is, when the two players simply play the Nash equilibrium strategies for $G(1)$ in each and every period, they reach an SPNE for $G(\infty)$.

This is easy to verify. At first, it is apparently a Nash equilibrium for $G(\infty)$. Does this Nash equilibrium ask players to play Nash equilibrium strategies in each and every subgame? The answer is positive since each subgame of $G(\infty)$ is $G(\infty)$ itself, and players are playing the same strategies in each and every period!

We have argued that the penalizing scheme recommended by Theorem 2 can indeed sustain a Nash equilibrium for $G(\infty)$ when δ is sufficiently close to 1, but it may fail to sustain an SPNE because carrying out the penalizing strategy may not be consistent with the penalizing players' interest; recall the preceding example.

One necessary condition for a penalizing scheme to be credible is that, after a deviation occurs, it is a new subgame-perfect equilibrium in the $G(\infty)$ starting from the next period that the penalizing players would carry out the penalizing scheme and the penalized player would rationally react to it. As playing the Nash equilibrium strategies for $G(1)$ in each and every period is an SPNE for $G(\infty)$, the following theorem follows.

17. **Theorem 3.** (Friedman’s (Nash-threats) Perfect Folk Theorem) Let $u(s) = e$ be an NE payoff profile in $G(1)$. For all $v \in V$ with $v_i > e_i$ for all i , v is a payoff profile of some subgame perfect NE in $G(\infty)$ as long as δ is close to 1.¹⁷

The idea is that when some deviation occurs, the players will play the Pareto dominated NE in $G(1)$ forever from the next stage on. This penalizing scheme is referred to as the *trigger strategy*. Again, we must check if this scheme is itself an SPNE in $G(\infty)$. First observe that playing the NE in $G(1)$ in each and every stage is certainly an NE for $G(\infty)$. Next, observe the stationarity of $G(\infty)$: at any stage t , the subgame is again $G(\infty)$. This implies that playing the NE in $G(1)$ in each and every stage is indeed an SPNE, for it specifies NE strategy profile to the players in each and every subgame (which is again $G(\infty)$). We thus have proven that the trigger strategy is itself an SPNE, and hence after a unilateral deviation occurs, playing the trigger strategy from the next stage on is credible!¹⁸

18. As an application of the perfect folk theorem, consider an infinitely repeated version of the prisoners’ dilemma discussed in Lecture 1.

| | | |
|-------------------|------|------|
| player 1/player 2 | C | D |
| C | 1,1 | -3,2 |
| D | 2,-3 | 0,0 |

What is the lowest common discount factor ρ that sustains cooperation in each period as an SPNE?

Consider the following pure strategy: play C (meaning “Cooperate”) as long as in the history no one has ever played D (meaning “Defect” or

¹⁷As we remarked earlier that $e_i \geq v_i$ for all $i = 1, 2, \dots, I$, Theorem 3 may give us an (incorrect) impression that requiring subgame perfection reduces the set of payoff profiles in V that can be sustained as a reasonable equilibrium outcome of $G(\infty)$. The problem is, again, that Theorem 3 assumes that the players can use only a particular type of penalizing schemes, called the *trigger strategy*, and if we consider (and characterize) all the possible SPNE penalizing schemes, we can actually implement a lot of payoff profiles not stated in Theorem 3; see below.

¹⁸The term “Folk Theorem” originates from the fact that its contents had long been recognized by people before a formal proof was created.

“Confess”), and play D forever if otherwise. Then both players’ playing this pure strategy constitutes an SPNE as long as ρ is high enough.

To see this, consider first the subgame where in the history there has been some player playing D before. In this case both will play D forever, and since (D,D) is the unique NE in the stage game, of course it remains to be an SPNE in the current infinitely repeated subgame. Next, consider the subgame where in the history nobody has played D before. Let the equilibrium continuation payoff for a player be denoted by π . Given this history, we show that no one has incentives to deviate unilaterally if ρ is large enough, and we shall derive the lowest ρ as required.

Expecting one’s rival to play C, if a player plays C also, he gets

$$\pi = 1 + \rho\pi,$$

implying that $\pi = \frac{1}{1-\rho}$; and if the player plays D instead, he gets 2 immediately, but this implies that at the beginning of the next round the history will be such that some player has played D before, implying that he will get nothing from the next round on. Thus for both players to play C, it is necessary and sufficient that

$$2 + \frac{\rho \cdot 0}{1 - \rho} \leq \pi = \frac{1}{1 - \rho},$$

or equivalently $\rho \geq \frac{1}{2}$.¹⁹

19. A manufacturer and a retailer are playing the following infinitely repeated supgame of $G(1)$, where the stage game $G(1)$ is described as follows. At each date t , the manufacturer can first decide whether to spend $c_m > 0$ and if only if it does, there will be consumers of population one that visit the retailer. The manufacturer also determines a wholesale price $w(t)$ for its product, which for simplicity can be produced without costs. If there are consumers visiting the retailer, they will buy certain goods from the retailer and the retailer will get $x > 0$, and moreover, if the retailer is willing to spend $c_r > 0$ on in-store promotion for the manufacturer’s product, then with probability

¹⁹The discount rate r and its corresponding discount factor ρ satisfy the familiar relationship: $\rho = \frac{1}{(1+r)}$. With continuous compounding, we have $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} (1 + \frac{r}{n})^{-n} = e^{-r}$.

$\pi \in (0, 1)$ these consumers will also have a valuation $v > 0$ for the manufacturer's product. After the retailer decides whether to spend c_r , a retail price $p(t)$ must be chosen for the manufacturer's product. Note that without the retailer's promotion effort, no consumers will buy the manufacturer's product. (Thus essentially we have a *moral hazard in team* problem.) Assume that whether the retailer has spent c_r cannot be detected by the manufacturer.²⁰ At date $t + 1$, however, the manufacturer can observe its own sales at date t , and it can try to infer from the sales data whether the retailer has promoted its product at date t . On the other hand, if the retailer has spent c_r at date t , then the retailer would observe whether consumers choose to purchase the manufacturer's product. Assume that $x + \pi v > c_m + c_r$, but $c_r \geq \pi v$.

(i) Show that in $G(1)$ neither the manufacturer nor the retailer promotes.

(ii) Consider $G(\infty)$. Assume that $\rho \in (0, 1)$ is the common discount factor for the two firms. Show that with T large enough, the following strategies constitute an SPNE for $G(\infty)$: Both firms spend on promotions, and if at date $t + 1$ the manufacturer knows that its profit is positive at date t , then both firms promote at date $t + 1$; or else, both firms play the stage game NE for a number of T periods, and then they return to cooperation at date $T + 1$. Find the smallest T^* in this class of SPNE's. Find conditions on c_r, c_m, π, ρ , and x so that such an SPNE with the least penalty can be sustained.

Solution. Consider part (i). Note that $c_r \geq \pi v$ and hence given any $w(t)$ promoting the manufacturer's product is a dominated strategy for the retailer in the stage game $G(1)$. Thus the retailer does not spend c_r in any NE of $G(1)$. It follows that the manufacturer does not promote either. The unique NE for the stage game involves no channel promotion at all.

Next consider part (ii). We shall look for SPNE's in Markov strat-

²⁰Thus this multi-stage game involves unobservable actions!

egy where both firms promote at date t if $v_{t-1} = v$, where v_{t-1} is consumers' valuation for the manufacturer's product at date $t - 1$. A Markov strategy makes the actions of punishment contingent only on the current state variable. If $v_{t-1} = 0$, then the Markov strategies trigger a T -period punishment. In the current context, an action of punishment consists of the firms' stopping promoting the product. We restrict attention to pure strategies. Let V_i^+ be the sum of discounted future profits of firm $i \in \{r, m\}$ at the beginning of a period t where $v_{t-1} = v$, and let V_i^- be the corresponding sum of discounted future profits at the beginning of period t where $v_{t-1} = 0$ and either $t = 2$ or $v_{t-2} = v$. Observe that along the equilibrium path, $w_t = p_t = v$. By definition, we thus have

$$\begin{aligned} V_r^+ &= -c_r + x + \pi\rho V_r^+ + (1 - \pi)\rho V_r^-, \\ V_r^- &= \rho^T V_r^+, \\ V_m^+ &= -c_m + \pi(v + \rho V_m^+) + (1 - \pi)\rho V_m^-, \\ V_m^- &= \rho^T V_m^+. \end{aligned}$$

Solving, we have

$$\begin{aligned} V_m^+ &= \frac{\pi v - c_m}{1 - (1 - \pi)\rho^{T+1} - \pi\rho}, & V_m^- &= \frac{\rho^T(\pi v - c_m)}{1 - (1 - \pi)\rho^{T+1} - \pi\rho}, \\ V_r^+ &= \frac{x - c_r}{1 - (1 - \pi)\rho^{T+1} - \pi\rho}, & V_r^- &= \frac{\rho^T(x - c_r)}{1 - (1 - \pi)\rho^{T+1} - \pi\rho}. \end{aligned}$$

The retailer does not want to deviate if and only if

$$c_r \leq \pi\rho(V_r^+ - V_r^-),$$

or equivalently,

$$(\pi x - c_r)\rho^{T+1} \leq \pi\rho x - c_r.$$

This IC is always violated unless $c_r < \pi\rho x < \pi x$, which we assume hereafter. In this case, the IC implies that

$$(\Gamma) \quad T \geq \frac{\log\left(\frac{\pi\rho x - c_r}{\pi x - c_r}\right)}{\log(\rho)} - 1.$$

Next, the manufacturer does not want to deviate if and only if

$$c_m - \pi v \leq \pi\rho(V_m^+ - V_m^-).$$

This inequality holds true always as long as $V_m^+ > 0$, which is true if and only if

$$\pi v > c_m.$$

Since V_m^+ and V_r^+ are both decreasing in T , the optimal SPNE in the class we described has T^* , which is the smallest integer exceeding

$$\frac{\log\left(\frac{\pi\rho x - c_r}{\pi x - c_r}\right)}{\log(\rho)} - 1.$$

The conditions required to sustain this SPNE are hence

$$c_r < \pi\rho x < \pi x, \quad \pi v > c_m.$$

20. Two identical firms facing a random, unobservable market demand try to sustain a tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated game of price competition. In each period, demand is either 0 with probability α or $D(p)$ with prob. $1 - \alpha$. When $D(p)$ is there, if two firms collude, they set prices at the monopoly level, i.e. $p_1 = p_2 = p_m$, and each gets a profit $\frac{\Pi_m}{2}$, where $\Pi_m > 0$ is the monopoly profit. If one firm deviates by reducing price to $p_m - \epsilon$, then it gets Π_m itself leaving nothing to its opponent. Firms cannot observe opponents' (current or past) actions. We now derive conditions under which the following trigger strategy sustains firms' collusive pricing behavior: If one firm finds out that it had no sales volume in the last period, then they begin to play Bertrand game for T periods, but after that, they go back to the collusive pricing again. (Wait! How can the other firm know that this firm's sales volume in the last period was zero and so it is prepared to play the Bertrand outcome in the current period?) Assume that the common

discount factor is $\delta \in (0, 1)$. Define V^+ and V^- as the continuation payoffs of a firm at the beginning of, respectively, a period where both firms had sales volumes last period, and a period where at least one firm had no sales volume in the last period but its sales volume in the period before the last period was still positive.²¹

(i) Show that

$$V^+ = (1 - \alpha)\left(\frac{\Pi_m}{2} + \delta V^+\right) + \alpha\delta V^-,$$

$$V^- = \delta^T V^+.$$

(ii) Show that the collusion can be sustained iff

$$V^+ \geq (1 - \alpha)(\Pi_m + \delta V^-) + \alpha\delta V^-.$$

(iii) Suppose that $\alpha = \frac{1}{4}$ and $\delta = \frac{7}{12}$. Find the smallest positive integer T such that the collusion can be sustained by the above described trigger-strategy penalizing scheme.

21. Consider example 1 in Lecture 1, part I, where firms 1 and 2 can costlessly produce a product and engage in Cournot competition with the inverse demand being, in the relevant range,

$$P(q_1 + q_2) = 1 - q_1 - q_2.$$

This problem is a modification of the above Cournot game.

(i) Assume that there are two dates. The two firms will compete at date 1, but at date 0, both firms can correctly expect the date-1 inverse demand function, which is the $P(\cdot)$ defined above. At date 0, the futures market opens for the product produced by the two firms. There are price-competitive investors in the futures market, who, just like the two firms, are risk neutral without time preferences (that is, there will be no discounting for anyone). The extensive game is as follows.

²¹Recall that the continuation payoff starting at date t is the (discounted) sum of the temporal payoff at date s , for all $s = t, t+1, \dots$. That is, the continuation payoff disregards the payoffs generated at date $1, 2, \dots, t-1$, because the latter payoffs are sunk at date t and are irrelevant regarding the subgame starting at date t .

- At date 0, (only) firm 1 can sign a futures contract with the competitive investors. In the futures contract, firm 1 promises to deliver f_1 units of the product at date 1 to one of the investors (say, Mr. A), and Mr. A promises to pay the price F (referred to as the date-0 futures price of the product). We assume that firm 1 announces f_1 , and the competitive investors then determine the futures price F . Assume that investors have rational expectations; that is, upon seeing f_1 , they can use backward induction to anticipate the date-1 price of the product (called the date-1 spot price of the product), and to rule out arbitrage opportunities, in the date-0 equilibrium, F must equal the anticipated date-1 price.
- At date 1, upon seeing firm 1's date-0 futures contract (f_1, F) , the two firms choose q_1 and q_2 simultaneously. Note that firm 1's profit as a function of q_1, q_2 is

$$\Pi_1(q_1, q_2; f_1) = [1 - q_1 - q_2][q_1 - f_1] + Ff_1.$$

Firm 2's profit function is still

$$\Pi_2(q_1, q_2) = [1 - q_1 - q_2]q_2.$$

- Then, after firms set q_1 and q_2 , the date-1 price $P(q_1, q_2)$ is realized, and firm 1 must deliver f_1 units of the product to Mr. A, and Mr. A must pay firm 1 Ff_1 dollars.

Find the SPNE of this extensive game. Explain why firm 1 may benefit from futures trading.²²

(ii) Now, suppose that both firms can engage in futures trading at date 0, with f_1 and f_2 units sold respectively at the futures price F determined at date 0. Again, assume that all investors in the futures market

²²**Hint:** Use backward induction. First consider the date-1 subgame with f_1 given. This is just a Cournot game with the two firms' profit functions being Π_1 and Π_2 specified above. Let the subgame equilibrium be $(q_1^*(f_1), q_2^*(f_1))$, which depends on f_1 . Now move backwards to consider firm 1's date-0 choice of f_1 . Remember that the investors in the futures market can rationally expect the date-1 spot price of the product, which is $P((q_1^*(f_1), q_2^*(f_1)))$, and given f_1 , they will compete in price so that in the date-0 futures market equilibrium, $F = P((q_1^*(f_1), q_2^*(f_1)))$. Given that $F = P((q_1^*(f_1), q_2^*(f_1)))$, find firm 1's optimal f_1 .

have rational expectations when they compete in price to determine F . Re-derive the SPNE. Explain why the two firms might be hurt by the availability of futures trading.²³

(iii) Now, call the extensive game described in part (ii) $G(1)$. Consider an infinitely repeated version $G(\infty)$ of $G(1)$, where both firm seek to maximize the sum of discounted profits with common discount factor $\rho \in (0, 1)$.²⁴ We shall consider both the case where the futures market is always open and the case where the futures market is always closed. Show that if the futures market is always open, then as long as ρ is large enough (i.e., it is sufficiently close to 1), there exists an SPNE supported by the trigger strategy, in which both firms produce $\frac{11}{30}$ at each and every date. Can this SPNE be supported by the trigger strategy if the futures market is always closed?

Solution. Consider part (i). It is straightforward to show that the two firms' date-1 reaction functions are

$$r_1^1(q_2; f_1) = \frac{1 + f_1 - q_2}{2}, \quad r_2^1(q_1) = \frac{1 - q_2}{2}.$$

Hence we have the subgame equilibrium

$$q_1^*(f_1) = \frac{1}{3} + \frac{2}{3}f_1, \quad q_2^*(f_1) = \frac{1}{3} - \frac{1}{3}f_1.$$

²³**Hint:** Again, consider the date-1 subgame with f_1, f_2 given. Now for $i = 1, 2$, firm i 's profit function becomes

$$\Pi_i(q_i, q_j; f_i) = [1 - q_i - q_j][q_i - f_i] + Ff_i.$$

Find the Nash equilibrium $(q_1^*(f_1, f_2), q_2^*(f_1, f_2))$ for this subgame. Now return to the date-0 futures market, where the two firms must simultaneously choose f_1 and f_2 . For each pair (f_1, f_2) announced, the investors can correctly expect the date-1 spot price, which must be $P((q_1^*(f_1, f_2), q_2^*(f_1, f_2)))$. Knowing that the futures price will be such that $F = P((q_1^*(f_1, f_2), q_2^*(f_1, f_2)))$, the two firms' choices (f_1, f_2) must form a Nash equilibrium at date 0.

²⁴More precisely, each date contains two subperiods, where in period 1 firms can trade futures, and then in period 2, firms select total outputs to engage in the Cournot competition. There is no discounting over the 2 periods in one date. There is discounting (with discount factor ρ) over any two consecutive dates.

Now consider firm 1's date-0 choice of f_1 . Since $F = P((q_1^*(f_1), q_2^*(f_1)))$, at date 0 firm 1 seeks to

$$\max_{f_1} P((q_1^*(f_1), q_2^*(f_1)))q_1^*(f_1) = \frac{1}{3}(1 - f_1)\left(\frac{1}{3} + \frac{2}{3}f_1\right),$$

for which the necessary and sufficient first-order condition gives

$$f_1 = \frac{1}{4},$$

implying that, in equilibrium,

$$F^* = P^* = \frac{1}{4}, \quad q_1^* = \frac{1}{2}, \quad q_2^* = \frac{1}{4}, \quad \Pi_1^* = \frac{1}{8}, \quad \Pi_2^* = \frac{1}{16}.$$

Compared to the Cournot equilibrium profit $\frac{1}{9}$, firm 1 is better off with futures trading. The reason is that after committing to sell f_1 units at a fixed price F , which will not fall when firm 1 expands output at date 1, firm 1 has an incentive to choose a higher total output at date 1. This fact results in firm 2 lowering output accordingly (because output choices are strategic substitutes). Consequently, firm 1 benefits from futures trading, which hurts firm 2 at the same time.

Next consider part (ii). Given (f_1, f_2) , now the subgame equilibrium becomes

$$q_1^*(f_1, f_2) = \frac{1}{3} + \frac{2}{3}f_1 - \frac{1}{3}f_2, \quad q_2^*(f_1, f_2) = \frac{1}{3} + \frac{2}{3}f_2 - \frac{1}{3}f_1, \quad P^*(f_1, f_2) = \frac{1}{3}(1 - f_1 - f_2).$$

Now consider the date-0 futures market equilibrium. Firm i 's problem is to, given the conjectured f_j ,

$$\max_{f_i} P(q_i^*(f_i, f_j), q_j^*(f_i, f_j))q_i^*(f_i, f_j) = \frac{1}{3}(1 - f_i - f_j)\left(\frac{1}{3} + \frac{2}{3}f_i - \frac{1}{3}f_j\right).$$

The necessary and sufficient first-order condition gives firm i 's date-0 reaction function

$$r_i^0(f_j) = \frac{1 - f_j}{4}, \quad i, j = 1, 2, \quad i \neq j.$$

Thus the date-0 equilibrium is

$$f_1^* = f_2^* = \frac{1}{5},$$

implying that

$$q_1^* = q_2^* = \frac{2}{5}, \quad F^* = P^* = \frac{1}{5}, \quad \Pi_1^* = \Pi_2^* = \frac{2}{25}.$$

Compared to the Cournot equilibrium profit, each firm is worse off. The reason is that, as in the game of prisoners' dilemma, here each firm intends to hold a short position in the futures contract as an attempt to force its rival to produce less. With the short positions in the futures contract, both firms are faced with a residual inverse demand with lower elasticity to their output expansion. Consequently, both firms choose to produce more in the subgame where futures contracts have been signed, leading to a lower spot and futures price for the product, and lower profit for each firm.

Finally, consider part (iii). Suppose that the futures market stays open forever. If the two firms choose $q_1 = q_2 = \frac{11}{30}$, their profits are $\Pi_1 = \Pi_2 = \frac{22}{225}$ in each period, so that they are better off than in the single-period equilibrium, where each earns $\frac{2}{25}$ by (ii). However, it is easy to verify that $q_1 = q_2 = \frac{11}{30}$ does not form a Nash equilibrium in the stage game. We claim that if ρ is sufficiently large, these outputs can indeed be sustained as an SPNE in $G(\infty)$ using a trigger strategy. Note that if firm 1 wishes to deviate, its optimal output choice would be $\frac{1-q_2}{2} = \frac{19}{60}$. Thus by making the optimal deviation firm 1's current profit would rise immediately to

$$\Pi_1(q_1 = \frac{19}{60}, q_2 = \frac{11}{30}) = \frac{19}{60} \left(1 - \frac{19}{60} - \frac{11}{30}\right) = \frac{361}{3600} > \frac{22}{225}.$$

Following the current period, firm 1 would earn $\frac{2}{25}$ in each of the remaining periods; recall part (ii). Thus making the deviation is not worthwhile if and only if

$$\frac{22}{225} + \frac{22}{225}\rho + \frac{22}{225}\rho^2 + \dots \geq \frac{361}{3600} + \frac{2}{25}\rho + \frac{2}{25}\rho^2 + \dots$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{22}{225} \times \frac{1}{1-\rho} \geq \frac{361}{3600} + \frac{2}{25} \times \frac{\rho}{1-\rho}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \rho \geq \frac{9}{73}.$$

Thus as long as $\rho \geq \frac{9}{73}$ there does exist an SPNE supported by the trigger strategy, where both firms produce $\frac{11}{30}$ in every period. Now, note the role of futures trading in leading to this conclusion. If the futures market stays closed forever, there does not exist such an SPNE sustained by the trigger strategy; simply note that both firms earn $\frac{1}{9}$ in the single-period equilibrium, where $\frac{1}{9} > \frac{22}{225}$.

22. Consider the following repeated game $G(\infty)$ with a seller and a buyer engaged in repeat purchase decisions.²⁵ At each date $t \in \mathbf{N}$, the seller first chooses to offer either a high-quality product or a low-quality product (together with a price p), which the buyer must decide to or not to accept. The buyer cannot tell the quality of the product on the selling spot (hence the product is an *experience good*). The buyer needs exactly one unit of the product at each date, and he attaches value $v > c$ to the high-quality good, where $c > 0$ is the seller's cost of producing one unit of the high-quality good. The low-quality good is considered worthless to the buyer and it incurs no production cost to the seller.

(i) First consider the stage game $G(1)$. Show that in the unique SPNE the seller produces only the low-quality product and prices it at $p = 0$.

(ii) Next consider $G(\infty)$ and let δ_s and δ_b be the discount factors of respectively the seller and the buyer. Show that for δ_s close to one, there exists an SPNE sustained by the trigger strategy, where at every date, the seller offers the high-quality good and prices it at $p = v$.

Solution. Consider part (i). Suppose that there exists an equilibrium where the seller produces the high-quality product and prices it at p , with $c \leq p \leq v$. In the equilibrium, the buyer believes that the seller will provide the high-quality product. Given the buyer's belief,

²⁵This model has a name; it is called a *relational model* in contract theory.

if the seller produces high-quality product, she earns $p - c$; if the seller deviates to produce low-quality product, she earns p (recall that the buyer can not tell the quality of the product on the selling spot). Thus, the seller has an incentive to deviate and produce a low-quality product. This proves that there does not exist an equilibrium where the seller produces the high-quality product. By similar reasoning, one can show that there does not exist an equilibrium where the seller randomizes between producing a high-quality product and a low-quality product either.

Now, does there exist an equilibrium where the seller produces a low-quality product? If such an equilibrium exists, the equilibrium product price is of course 0. In this equilibrium, the buyer believes that the seller will provide the low-quality product. Given the buyer's belief, even if the seller provides a high-quality product, the buyer would not know that and would still want to pay zero for the product. Thus, the seller has no incentive to deviate. Therefore, the unique SPNE is that the seller produces only the low-quality product and prices it at $p = 0$.

Consider part (ii). We shall show that for δ_s close to one, the following strategies constitute an SPNE for $G(\infty)$: The seller offers the high-quality good with price $p = v$ at every date, and at the beginning of date t , the buyer purchases the good as long as the seller has never offered the low-quality product before date t . Otherwise, the buyer purchases the good only if $p = 0$. Given the buyer's strategy, the seller would like to offer the high-quality product at every date if and only if

$$\frac{v - c}{1 - \delta_s} \geq (v - 0) + 0,$$

or equivalently, $\delta_s \geq \frac{c}{v}$. Therefore, for δ_s close to one, there exists an SPNE where the seller offers the high-quality good at every date, and prices it at $p = v$. This game can be modified by assuming an infinite sequence of short-term buyers with a perfect word-of-mouth effect, and the conclusion will be identical. The date- n buyer would be ready to pay v for the date- n product offered by the seller if all preceding buyers were served with the high-quality product; or else, all buyers from date n on would pay zero.

23. Consider a seller and a buyer interacting with each other at dates $n = 0, 1, \dots$. At each date n , the seller can first decide to or not to spend $F > 0$ on advertising its price p_n . If the seller spends F on date n , then the buyer knows p_n , before he chooses to or not to spend $t > 0$ to visit the seller's store. The buyer has unit demand for the seller's product, and his valuation is $v > 0$ at each date n . The common discount factor is $\rho \in (0, 1)$ for the seller and the buyer. Note that if the seller chooses not to spend F at date n , then the buyer must choose to or not to spend t before learning p_n . We assume that at the beginning of each date n , with probability $1 - q \in (0, 1)$ another seller with a much better product may appear, and when she does, the buyer will not deal with the existing seller any more; that is, the old seller would face with no demand from date n on, if that new seller emerges. (We shall let q represent the market status of the old seller's brand; a lower q indicates that the old seller has a weak product, which may be easily replaced by a newly introduced product.)

(i) Derive a condition on t, q, ρ, v , and F which ensures the existence of an SPNE sustained by the trigger strategy, where in equilibrium the seller never spends F at any date, but the buyer keeps buying from the seller at each date till the superior new seller shows up. Find one such SPNE which is most favorable to the seller.

(ii) Derive a condition on t, q, ρ, v , and F which ensures the existence of an SPNE in which the seller spends F at each date till the superior new seller appears. Find one such SPNE which is most favorable to the seller.

Solution. For part (i), if such an SPNE exists, then in equilibrium the seller must price at $p_n \leq v - t$ at each date n , and in the SPNE most favorable to the seller (we focus on this one), the seller will price exactly at $v - t$ at each date n . The buyer's equilibrium strategy is to visit the seller at date n if and only if the seller has spent F at date n or if for all $m \leq n - 1$, $p_m \leq v - t$.

The seller's equilibrium behavior is to price at $v - t$ at each and every

date, so that the seller's equilibrium continuation payoff at date n is

$$(v - t) + \rho q(v - t) + \rho^2 q^2(v - t) + \dots = \frac{(v - t)}{1 - \rho q}.$$

By making a unilateral deviation and pricing at v at date n , the seller's continuation payoff would become

$$v + \frac{\rho q \max(0, v - t - F)}{1 - \rho q}.$$

In equilibrium, the seller should have no incentives to make unilateral deviations. Thus we require that, if $F \geq v - t$,

$$t \leq \frac{\rho q(v - t)}{1 - \rho q} \Leftrightarrow t \leq \rho q v.$$

If instead $F < v - t$, then we require that

$$t \leq \frac{\rho q F}{1 - \rho q}.$$

Written compactly, the condition that we are looking for in part (i) is

$$t \leq \frac{\rho q \min(F, v - t)}{1 - \rho q}.$$

This finishes part (i).

Now, the SPNE described in part (ii) can arise only if $F + t < v$ and only if the *buyer would stop visiting the seller had the seller not spent F at least once in the past*. The latter is impossible, for the seller can always spend F and price slightly below $v - t$ in any period following a deviation. Thus no SPNE described in part (ii) can arise.

24. As we remarked in a preceding footnote, one might get the impression from the two preceding folk theorems that requiring subgame perfection reduces the set of payoff profiles that can be sustained in the SPNE's of $G(\infty)$. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) show that this need not be the case.

Theorem 4. (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) Every $v \in V^*$ can be sustained in some SPNE of $G(\infty)$ if $I = 2$ or if $I \geq 3$ but V is convex with dimension I .²⁶

To prove the assertion for two-player games (i.e. $I = 2$), Fudenberg and Maskin employ Abreu’s (1988) result (see Fudenberg and Tirole’s *Game Theory*, Theorem 5.6) that SPNE penalizing schemes can without loss of generality be confined to simple punishments: a punishment is *simple* if it depends only on the identity of the latest unilateral deviator. Assuming that $\underline{v} = 0$,²⁷ Fudenberg and Maskin show that given $v \in V^* = V \cap \mathcal{R}_+^I$, the following strategies constitute an SPNE: play the profile s with $u(s) = v$ until unilateral deviations occur, and in the latter case minmax the deviator for a long enough period of time (“enough” means to wipe out the deviator’s gain from deviation) and then return to the profile s . If a further deviation occurs, start a new punishment phase against the new deviator (so that all old deviators are exonerated at this point).²⁸

²⁶The dimension of a convex set in \mathcal{R}^N is the dimension of the smallest affine set containing the convex set.

²⁷This is a harmless assumption, given that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is determined only up to a positive affine transformation.

²⁸Note that Theorem 4 only shows that minmax strategies can be used in the penalty phase so that a cooperative SPNE can be sustained when δ is sufficiently high. It does not assert that this class of penalizing strategies will make that SPNE most likely to be sustained. For example, consider the repeated Cournot duopoly where the two firms face the temporal inverse demand $P = 1 - q_1 - q_2$ at each period t , and consider how the collusive outcome where each produces $\frac{1}{4}$ units in each period can be sustained as an SPNE in $G(\infty)$. If the trigger strategy is used to penalize the deviator in the penalty phase, then this collusive outcome is sustained as an SPNE in $G(\infty)$ as long as $\delta > \frac{9}{17}$. (To see this, recall that each firm’s temporal profit is $\frac{1}{9}$ and the temporal collusive profit is $\frac{1}{8}$. Deviation unilaterally by producing the output $\frac{3}{8}$ implies an immediate gain of $\frac{1}{64}$.) Now, if instead the minmax strategy is used to penalize the deviator(s), then to wipe out the immediate gain from unilateral deviation from the collusive outcome it requires that the other firm minmax the deviator for just one period, as long as $\delta > \frac{1}{8}$. But this also requires the penalizing firm to produce 1 unit in that penalizing period, and the penalizing firm may wish to deviate and produce $\frac{1}{2}$ units and get an immediate gain of $\frac{1}{4}$ instead, which is much larger than $\frac{1}{64}$! To wipe out the gain from this penalizing firm, when it does deviate, the original deviator (who is now exonerated!) must minmax it for, say, 4 periods if $\delta = \frac{3}{4}$ for example:

$$\frac{1}{8} \left[\frac{3}{4} + \frac{9}{16} + \frac{27}{64} + \frac{81}{256} \right] > \frac{1}{4}.$$

25. To demonstrate Fudenberg and Maskin's idea for the case $I = 2$, consider the infinitely repeated version $G(\infty)$ of the Cournot game in section 11 of Lecture 1, part I, where firms seek to maximize the sum of discounted profits with $\delta \in (0, 1)$ being the two firms' common discount factor. First verify that for firm i , $m_{-i}^i = 1$, and $m_i^i = v_i = 0$. Is there an SPNE where each firm earns a profit $\frac{5}{72}$ in each and every period for δ large enough? (**Hint:** Consider $Q_0 = \{(q_1 = \frac{5}{12}, q_2 = \frac{5}{12}), (q_1 = \frac{5}{12}, q_2 = \frac{5}{12}), (q_1 = \frac{5}{12}, q_2 = \frac{5}{12}), \dots\}$, supported by Q_{-i} and Q_i , where $Q_i = \{(q_{(t+1)i} = 0, q_{(t+1)j} = 1), (q_{(t+2)i} = 0, q_{(t+2)j} = 1), (q_{(t+3)i} = 0, q_{(t+3)j} = 1), \dots, (q_{(t+T)i} = 0, q_{(t+T)j} = 1), (q_1 = \frac{5}{12}, q_2 = \frac{5}{12}), (q_1 = \frac{5}{12}, q_2 = \frac{5}{12}), \dots\}$, and $Q_{-i} = \{(q_{(t+1)i} = 1, q_{(t+1)j} = 0), (q_{(t+2)i} = 1, q_{(t+2)j} = 0), (q_{(t+3)i} = 1, q_{(t+3)j} = 0), \dots, (q_{(t+T')i} = 1, q_{(t+T')j} = 0), (q_1 = \frac{5}{12}, q_2 = \frac{5}{12}), (q_1 = \frac{5}{12}, q_2 = \frac{5}{12}), \dots\}$. The following is how these strategies work: The two firms play Q_0 until at some date s firm i makes a unilateral deviation, and from the next date on, firm i is minmaxed for T periods, and if further deviations occur, all old deviators are exonerated, and the new deviator will be minmaxed for T' periods. After minmax stage is over, the two firms start playing Q_0 until further deviations take place.)

Solution. If firm j wants to minmax firm i , then firm j should choose q_j to minimize $r_i(q_j) = \frac{1-q_j}{2}$, and hence firm j should choose $q_j = 1$, which implies that, when minmaxed, firm i does not produce anything, and it gets zero profit. Now, by symmetry, the same conclusion applies to firm j . It follows that the output pair $(q_1 = \frac{5}{12}, q_2 = \frac{5}{12})$ is both *feasible* and *individually rational* (meaning that the pair generates for each firm a profit higher than a firm's minmax profit level, which is zero). Theorem 4 tells us that, yes, this output pair can be sustained as an SPNE outcome in each period of the above infinitely repeated game. Call the path where both firms produce $\frac{5}{12}$ at each date the equilibrium path Q_0 . Can we sustain Q_0 by the trigger strategy? No, because the trigger strategy SPNE is one where both firms produce $\frac{1}{3}$,

This explains why δ has to be much higher in order to make the minmax penalizing strategy work. In fact, for the minmax strategy to successfully sustain the collusive outcome in each and every period, we require $\delta + \delta^2 + \dots > \frac{1}{\frac{1}{3}} = 2$, or $\delta > \frac{2}{3}$. That is, for δ lying between $\frac{9}{17}$ and $\frac{2}{3}$, the trigger penalizing strategy can be used to sustain the collusive outcome as an SPNE in $G(\infty)$, but the minmax strategy fails to do so.

yielding for each firm a profit higher than the profit in equilibrium Q_0 at each date.

So, how can we sustain this SPNE Q_0 ? Theorem 4 tells us that, in the current case, we can distinguish between two types of deviators, the one who should be minmaxed, and the one who should minmax its rival. For this reason, we must require different lengths in the penalty stage, depending on which type of deviator the punishment is intended to be imposed on.

Imagine that firm i deviates from Q_0 at date n by setting $q_i = \frac{1-\frac{5}{12}}{2} = \frac{7}{24}$, leading to a one-time gain

$$\frac{7}{24}\left[1 - \frac{5}{12} - \frac{7}{24}\right] - \frac{5}{12}\left[1 - \frac{5}{12} - \frac{5}{12}\right] = \frac{9}{576}.$$

From date $n+1$ on, firm j must minmax firm i for T periods, such that

$$T = \min\left\{\tau : \frac{5}{12}\left[1 - \frac{5}{12} - \frac{5}{12}\right](\delta + \delta^2 + \dots + \delta^\tau) \geq \frac{9}{576}\right\}.$$

After minmaxing firm i for T periods, firm j , together with firm i , start playing Q_0 again. This path, starting with date $n+1$, is referred to as Q_i .

If firm j deviates from Q_i at any date $m \in \{n+1, n+2, \dots, n+T\}$ by setting $q_j = \frac{1}{2}$ at date m , then the one-time gain that firm j obtains from the deviation at date m is

$$\frac{1}{2}\left[1 - 0 - \frac{1}{2}\right] - 1\left[1 - 0 - 1\right] = \frac{1}{4}.$$

Starting from date $m+1$ on, firm i has to minmax firm j for T' periods, where

$$T' = \min\left\{m - n + \tau : \frac{5}{12}\left[1 - \frac{5}{12} - \frac{5}{12}\right]\delta^{n-m}(\delta + \delta^2 + \dots + \delta^\tau) \geq \frac{1}{4}\right\}.$$

After minmaxing firm j for T' periods, firm i , together with firm j , start playing Q_0 from the next date on. This path, starting with date $m+1$, is referred to as Q_{-i} .

Once gain, if firm i deviates from Q_{-i} at some date m' , then from date $m'+1$ on, the two firms play Q_{-j} , and so on and so forth. It is

easy to verify that the above strategies do form an SPNE, where the equilibrium path Q_0 is supported by Q_1, Q_2, Q_{-1} , and Q_{-2} .

26. How about Fudenberg and Maskin's proof for the case $I \geq 3$? It turns out the above penalizing schemes used in the proof for the case $I = 2$ cannot work in general, since threatening to minmax all $I \geq 3$ players in different punishment phases is rather difficult to be compatible with an SPNE. The following is an example.

Example 1. There are three players. Each player can choose between a and b in each stage. Payoffs are zero for everyone unless their choices are the same, and in the latter case each gets 1. Show that, although the common minmax value for the three players is zero (where for all distinct $i, j, k \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, m_{-i}^j consists of player j playing a and player k playing b), for $\delta < 1$ no SPNE of $G(\infty)$ gives an average payoff that lies in the interval $[0, \frac{1}{4}]$.²⁹

Proof. Define α as the infimum of a player's average payoff which she obtains in any SPNE of $G(\infty)$. (By symmetry, α does not depend on the identity of the player.) We must show $\alpha \geq \frac{1}{4}$. At any stage, the equilibrium strategy profile must be such that there exists player i such that the other two players both assign to a or to b a probability that is less than or equal to $\frac{1}{2}$. Either way, player i can ensure herself an immediate payoff of $\frac{1}{4}$ by betting on the choice between a and b which her rivals both assign a probability of at least $\frac{1}{2}$. This is one feasible deviation from the supposed equilibrium profile, and it generates a payoff for player i of at least

$$\frac{1}{4} + \frac{\delta\alpha}{1 - \delta},$$

which, by the assumption that initially we are in an SPNE, should be less than any perfect equilibrium payoff for player i . Let $\{\alpha_n\}$ be a sequence of SPNE payoffs for player i converging to α . (Recall that the infimum of a set $A \subset \mathcal{R}$ must be a limit point of A .) Then, for each n , the n -th SPNE must be robust against the feasible deviation we just designed for player i , which implies that

²⁹Note that in minmaxing some player i , each of the two penalizers gets zero payoff in each penalizing stage, but one of the penalizers can get an immediate payoff of at least $\frac{1}{2}$ by deviation.

$$\frac{1}{4} + \frac{\delta\alpha}{1-\delta} \leq \frac{\alpha_n}{1-\delta}, \quad \forall n.$$

Passing n to ∞ , we have

$$\frac{1}{4} + \frac{\delta\alpha}{1-\delta} \leq \frac{\alpha}{1-\delta},$$

implying that $\alpha \geq \frac{1}{4}$. This example shows that, unlike in the two-player case, with 3 or more than 3 players, not all feasible and enforceable payoff vectors in $G(1)$ are sustainable as the average payoff of some SPNE in $G(\infty)$.³⁰

27. Because of Example 1, Fudenberg and Maskin turn to reward schemes in proving their assertion for the case $I \geq 3$. The idea is that after some unilateral deviation by deviator i from v , all other players should minmax the deviator for a long enough period of time and then all players except the punished deviator get to play some profile which gives them payoffs which are higher than their individual minmax values (but still lower than the payoffs they would have received in the original SPNE if player i had not deviated). Again, if a further deviation occurs, then the players follow the same procedure to implement a new punishment phase against the new deviator, and all the previous deviators are exonerated. This penalizing scheme works because a player who is supposed to join force with other players to minmax an earlier deviator would lose the chance to obtain a higher payoff after the minmaxing phase if she chose to deviate and maximize her one-period payoff. For

³⁰For example, imagine that we want to implement a payoff profile where all 3 players get $\frac{1}{8}$. Assume that mixed strategies are detectable for the moment, and think about the strategy profile to be implemented consists of players 1 and 2 playing a and player 3 choosing a with probability $\frac{1}{8}$. Now if player 3 has deviated and chosen a for sure, and in coordinating their actions to minmax player 3 player 1 should play a and player 2 should play b , in anticipation of player 3's response of, say, choosing a or b with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, then player 1 can deviate and choose b for sure instead, which, as we can verify, also imply that the other two players can get the immediate payoff $\frac{1}{2}$. (This payoff becomes 1 if player 3's m_3^3 is a pure strategy!) Thus in anticipation of the high payoff during the period a player is to be minmaxed, that player will not tolerate an equilibrium payoff of $\frac{1}{8}$, even though $\frac{1}{8}$ is higher than that player's minmax value in $G(1)$.

such a scheme to work, it must be required that offering rewards to the penalizing players without simultaneously benefiting the original deviator be always possible; i.e., V^* must possess some “interior” property. (Example 1 fails to possess this property.) Being convex and having full dimension in \mathcal{R}^I , V^* has a non-empty interior.³¹

28. Here we give an example for the SPNE’s in some $G(\infty)$.

Example 2. Consider the following 2-person stage game $G(1)$ in normal form:

| | | | |
|-----|-------|------|---------|
| 1/2 | L | M | R |
| L | 10,10 | 3,15 | 0,7 |
| M | 15,3 | 7,7 | -4,5 |
| R | 7,0 | 5,-4 | -15,-15 |

Players can use only pure strategies. Suppose that $\delta = \frac{4}{7}$. A perfect equilibrium in simple strategy profile is a triple of SPNE’s (Q_0, Q_1, Q_2) such that in equilibrium the outcome path is Q_0 and in case player i deviates unilaterally the outcome path becomes Q_i . Show that the following is an SPNE:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Q_0 &= (L, L), \forall t; \\
 Q_1 &= (M, R), (L, M), (L, M), \dots \\
 Q_2 &= (R, M), (M, L), (M, L), \dots
 \end{aligned}$$

³¹We mentioned earlier that the joint minmax strategy against player i is typically a profile of mixed strategies in $G(1)$. For example, suppose that player 1 and player 2 must jointly minmax player 3, with player 1 choosing action L and M with probability 0.4 and 0.6 respectively, leaving another action R un-used. A deviation by player 1 can be detected if player 1 is found to have used action R. Thus player 1 will become the latest deviator and will be minmaxed subsequently after the players observe player 1’s action R in the previous stage. For the penalizing scheme to work, there is more that needs to be satisfied: player 1, without wanting to take action R, should also feel indifferent between action L and action M! Thus the penalizing scheme must give player 1 different payoffs following player 1’s action L than action M. The bottom line here is that, the penalizing scheme can be very complicated, exactly because *a mixed strategy cannot be observed, only actions that the mixed strategy randomly chooses may be observed*, and hence the penalizing scheme must trigger different actions to be taken by the players following different observed actions taken in the preceding stage by the penalizing players.

Show that Q_i gives the lowest payoff to player i among all the SPNEs for $G(\infty)$.³²

Proof. First verify that there is a unique (pure strategy) NE in $G(1)$, which is (M, M) . In this game, we interpret (L, L) as the collusive outcome that the two players (two firms, say) would like to sustain. Suppose that σ is an SPNE for $G(\infty)$ following a deviation from Q_0 , with $v_i(\sigma)$ being player i 's average payoff in the SPNE σ . Then for Q_0 to be sustained by σ , it must be that

$$5 \leq \frac{\delta}{1 - \delta}(10 - v_i(\sigma)), \quad \forall i.$$

If we are restricted to using only the trigger strategy in punishing deviations, then $v_i(\sigma) = 7$, and hence Q_0 cannot be sustained as an SPNE: we have assumed that $\delta = \frac{4}{7}$, but Q_0 can be sustained by the trigger strategy if and only if $\delta \geq \frac{5}{8}$. This exercise shows that more severe punishments than the trigger strategy such as Q_1 and Q_2 can still be designed to sustain Q_0 as an SPNE for $G(\infty)$.

The triple (Q_0, Q_1, Q_2) defined above actually contains three SPNE profiles. We shall show that both players playing L all the time is an SPNE which is supported by Q_1 and Q_2 : If player i deviates from playing L unilaterally at stage t , then start Q_i at stage $t+1$, with player i playing M and player j playing R at stage $t+1$, and with player i

³²Fudenberg and Levine (1983) show that if the stage game is a finite game, then for each player i the worst possible SPNE Q_i in $G(\infty)$ always exists. Abreu (1988) show that the same is true if I is finite, and for all $i = 1, 2, \dots, I$, A_i is a compact subset of some finite-dimensional Euclidean space, with the one-stage payoff function $u_i(\cdot)$ being continuous. Moreover, for a finite game $G(1)$, any SPNE outcome of $G(\infty)$ can be sustained as an SPNE outcome when unilateral deviation by player i is always followed by an immediate switch from the original SPNE to Q_i . Abreu (1988) also shows that, if I is finite, and for all $i = 1, 2, \dots, I$, A_i is a compact subset of some finite-dimensional Euclidean space, with the one-stage payoff function $u_i(\cdot)$ being continuous, and if there is a pure-strategy NE in $G(1)$, then the same conclusion holds; that is, any SPNE outcome of $G(\infty)$ can be sustained as an SPNE outcome when unilateral deviation by player i is always followed by an immediate switch from the original SPNE to Q_i . Note that these penalizing schemes are *simple*, in the sense that they depend only on the identity of the latest deviator: if player i is the latest deviator, then the implemented penalizing scheme is Q_i , regardless of what happened before player i 's latest deviation.

playing L and player j playing M in each and every subsequent stage. We shall also show that Q_1 and Q_2 are themselves SPNEs, and are self-supported: If player j deviates from Q_k at stage τ , where $k \in \{1, 2\}$, then restart Q_j at stage $\tau + 1$. Let us now verify that these claims are all true.

First we verify that each Q_i is an SPNE supported by the set of punishments $\{Q_1, Q_2\}$. Suppose that player 1 just deviated unilaterally at stage $t - 1$ so that Q_1 is now in force at stage t . Then player 1's optimal deviation (recall that we only need to check "one-stage" deviations) at this stage is to play L . This will make player 2 play R in the subsequent stages until player 1 finally plays M . But, by conforming, player 1 gets

$$-4 + \frac{\delta \cdot 3}{1 - \delta} = 0,$$

so that player 1 had better conform. (Note that player 1 attains her minmax payoff, which is zero, in the SPNE Q_1 .) On the other hand, player 2 will play R at stage t because by conforming she gets

$$5 + \frac{\delta \cdot 15}{1 - \delta} > 7 + \delta \left[-4 + \frac{\delta \cdot 3}{1 - \delta} \right] = 7,$$

where the right-hand side is what she gets by deviating and playing M , which is followed by Q_2 from stage $t + 1$ on. Thus $\{Q_1, Q_2\}$ are self-supported SPNE in $G(\infty)$, with the equilibrium payoff of player i in Q_i attaining player i 's minmax payoff level, proving that these profiles do attain the minimum payoffs within the class of SPNE's of $G(\infty)$.

Finally, we need to verify that players do not want to unilaterally deviate from Q_0 , knowing that Q_i will be in force after player i unilaterally deviates, but this is straightforward.

29. Part III.

30. Fudenberg and Levine (1983) give a connection between finite- and infinite-horizon games. They show that under certain conditions, σ^* is an SPNE for $G(\infty)$ if and only if it is the limit in product topology of a sequence σ^T of ϵ_T -perfect equilibrium (cf. Lecture 1, Part II) of a sequence of truncated games $G(T)$ with $\epsilon_T \rightarrow 0$. In this case the set of SPNE of $G(\infty)$ is non-empty and compact.

31. (**Finitely Repeated Games.**) Now we review one important result for $G(T)$. As we remarked earlier, if $G(1)$ is the prisoners' dilemma introduced in Lecture 1, then $G(T)$ has a unique SPNE where the players simply play the unique NE in $G(1)$ in each and every stage. However, stage games with a unique NE are rare. In the remaining case, we have

Theorem 5. (Benoit and Krishna, 1985)

If for all i , there are two NE's in $G(1)$ yielding different payoffs for player i , and if the dimension of V is I , then for all feasible and enforceable payoff profile v , for all $\epsilon > 0$, there exists some $T(\epsilon, v)$ such that some SPNE in $G(T)$, $T \geq T(\epsilon, v)$, generates a payoff profile which is within ϵ of v .

Instead of proving the Theorem, we shall consider a series of examples (Examples 3-6 below) that demonstrate the intuition behind this result. Since there is a unique SPNE in $G(T)$ whenever there is a unique NE in $G(1)$, these examples assume that $G(1)$ has at least 2 NE's.

32. **Example 3.** Consider the following stage game $G(1)$:

| | | |
|-----|-----|------|
| 1/2 | L | R |
| U | 0,0 | 1, 2 |
| D | 2,1 | 0,0 |

Consider $G(T)$ where players receive "sum of stage payoffs." Suppose that players can only use pure strategies. Let $P(T)$ be the set of SPNE payoff profiles for $G(T)$. Let $Q(1) = P(1)$ and $\text{eff}Q(1)$ be the efficient frontier of $Q(1)$. Let $R(1) = \text{eff}Q(1)$, and for $t \in \{2, 3, \dots, T\}$, define $Q(t) \equiv \{u(\sigma) \in P(t) : \text{all continuation payoffs prescribed by } \sigma \text{ on } G(t-1) \text{ lie in } R(t-1)\}$ and $R(t) = \text{eff}Q(t)$. We say that an SPNE σ of $G(T)$ is renegotiation-proof if $u(\sigma) \in R(T)$. Thus the players cannot commit to play Pareto dominated SPNE's in later stages. The idea is that any Pareto dominated SPNE may cause renegotiations (and hence not *renegotiation-proof*), which will Pareto improve the players' continuation payoffs by directing the players' attention to some Pareto superior SPNE. We shall show that

$$R \equiv \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} R(T) = \text{co}\{(1, 2), (2, 1)\}.$$

Note that $P(1) = \{(2, 1), (1, 2)\} = Q(1) = \text{eff}Q(1)$. Note that

$$P(2) = \{(4, 2), (2, 4), (3, 3)\}, \quad Q(2) = \text{eff}Q(2) = P(2).$$

Continuing this way, one can show that for all $t \in \{1, 2, \dots, T\}$, $\frac{1}{T}[t(2, 1) + (T - t)(1, 2)]$ is a per-period average payoff profile attained by some renegotiation-proof SPNE in $G(T)$. Now for each $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, and for each $n \in \mathbf{Z}_+$, there exists $m(n) \in \{0, 1, \dots, n - 1\}$ such that $\frac{m(n)}{n} \leq \alpha \leq \frac{m(n)+1}{n}$ so that

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \left| \alpha - \frac{m(n)}{n} \right| \leq \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} = 0.$$

Of course, this only shows that the set of attainable payoff profiles in renegotiation-proof SPNE's of $G(T)$ for some T is *dense* in $\text{co}\{(2, 1), (1, 2)\}$; it does not mean that each point in the latter set is actually attained by some renegotiation-proof SPNE in $G(T)$ for some T .

33. Example 3 shows that only the efficient payoff profiles in $G(1)$ are retained in the set of reasonable equilibrium payoff profiles in $G(T)$, as long as T is large enough. This example, however, is misleading, as we shall demonstrate below.
34. **Example 4.** Consider the following stage game $G(1)$:

| | | | |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 1/2 | L | M | R |
| L | 5,3 | 0,0 | 2,0 |
| M | 0,0 | 2,2 | 0,0 |
| R | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 |

Consider $G(T)$ where players receive “sum of stage payoffs.” Suppose that players can only use pure strategies.

- (i) Show that there are two pure NE's in $G(1)$.
- (ii) Suppose players can use only pure strategies in $G(2)$, where players' payoffs are averages of temporal payoffs. Show that $\{(R,R), (L,L)\}$ is an SPNE in $G(2)$. Show by means of this fact that it is not possible to sustain all SPNE's in $G(7)$ using Friedman's trigger strategies.

Solution. For part (i), (L, L) and (M, M) are the two NE's. In part (ii), it is easy to see that the claimed profiles form an SPNE in

$G(2)$, which is supported by the threat of playing (M, M) in stage 2 if unilateral deviations occur in stage 1. The average payoff for player 2 in this SPNE is $1.5 < 2$, where 2 is the worst NE payoff in $G(1)$ for both players. Obviously, 1.5 is the worst average SPNE payoff for player 2 in $G(2)$ (correspondingly, 2 is the worst average SPNE payoff for player 1). Consider the following profiles in $G(7)$:

$$Q = \{(L, R), (M, M), (M, M), (M, M), (M, M), (M, M), (M, M)\},$$

which cannot be sustained as an SPNE by trigger strategies. But, it is still an SPNE, and the supporting strategies can be

$$\{(R, R), (L, L), (R, R), (L, L), (R, R), (L, L)\}$$

in $G(6)$ in case unilateral deviations occur in stage 1.

35. **Example 5.** Consider the following stage game $G(1)$:

| | | | |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 1/2 | L | M | R |
| L | 0,0 | 1,2 | 0,0 |
| M | 2,1 | 0,0 | 4,0 |
| R | 0,0 | 0,4 | 3,3 |

Consider $G(T)$ where players receive “sum of stage payoffs.” Suppose that players can only use pure strategies. Find $R \equiv \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} R(T)$. Is it in $\text{eff}V^*$? (**Hint:** There are two pure strategy NE’s in $G(1)$, yielding payoff profiles $(1, 2)$ and $(2, 1)$ respectively. Note that

$$Q(2) = \{(4, 2), (3, 3), (2, 4), (5, 2), (2, 5)\},$$

where $(5, 2)$ is associated with the SPNE $\{(M, R), (L, M)\}$ and $(2, 5)$ is associated with the SPNE $\{(R, M), (M, L)\}$. Hence

$$R(2) = \{(3, 3), (5, 2), (2, 5)\}.$$

It follows that

$$Q(3) = \{(5, 4), (7, 3), (4, 6), (4, 5), (3, 7), (6, 4), (6, 5), (5, 6), (6, 6)\},$$

where (6, 5) is associated with the SPNE $\{(M, R), (R, M), (M, L)\}$, (5, 6) is associated with the SPNE $\{(R, M), (M, R), (L, M)\}$, and (6, 6) is associated with the SPNE $\{(R, R), (L, M), (M, L)\}$. Hence

$$R(3) = \{(7, 3), (3, 7), (6, 6)\}.$$

Note that, for $T \geq 3$, there exists an SPNE of $G(T)$ where (R, R) can be played in the first stage.³³ Continuing this way, one can show that

$$Q(4) = \{(9, 4), (5, 8), (8, 7), (8, 5), (4, 9), (7, 8), (10, 6), (7, 7), (6, 10), (9, 9)\}$$

and

$$R(4) = \{(10, 6), (6, 10), (9, 9)\}.$$

For T large, we have

$$R(T) = \{(3T - 3, 3T - 3), (3T - 2, 3T - 6), (3T - 6, 3T - 2)\},$$

so that

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} R(T) = \{(3, 3)\} \subset \text{eff}(V^*).$$

This example shows that the set R may have a dimensionality smaller than the dimensionality of the set of Nash equilibrium payoff profiles of the stage game!

36. **Example 6.** Consider the following stage game $G(1)$:

| | | | | |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 1/2 | L | M | R | A |
| L | 0,0 | 2,4 | 0,0 | 6,0 |
| M | 4,2 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 |
| R | 0,0 | 0,0 | 3,3 | 0,0 |
| B | 0,6 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 5,5 |

Consider $G(T)$ where players receive “sum of stage payoffs.” Suppose that players can only use pure strategies. We shall show that $R = \{(4, 4)\}$, and verify that $(4, 4)$ is not contained in $\text{eff}(V^*)$.

³³The action pair (R,R) cannot be sustained as the first-stage outcome in $G(2)$ because *each of the two players* can unilaterally deviate and obtain an additional first-stage payoff of 1. If (R,R) is followed by the second-stage action pair (M,L), then player 2 strictly wants to deviate from (R,R) in the first stage; and if (R,R) is followed by the second-stage action pair (L,M), then player 1 strictly wants to deviate from (R,R) in the first stage.

Note that

$$P(1) = \{(4, 2), (2, 4), (3, 3)\} = Q(1) = \text{eff}Q(1),$$

and that

$$P(2) = \{(8, 4), (4, 8), (6, 6), (5, 7), (7, 5), (8, 8)\} \Rightarrow R(2) = \text{eff}Q(2) = \{(8, 8)\},$$

where $(8, 8)$ is sustained by the strategy profile where the two players play (B, A) and then (R, R) , and if (B, A) was not observed, then play either (M, L) or (L, M) depending on who the deviator is. Continuing this way, one can show that for all $T = 2n$, $n \in \mathbf{Z}_+$, $\frac{1}{T}R(T) = \{(4, 4)\}$, and for $T = 2n - 1$, on the other hand, we have

$$\frac{1}{T}R(T) = \{(4, 4 - \frac{2}{T}), (4 - \frac{2}{T}, 4), (4 - \frac{1}{T}, 4 - \frac{1}{T})\}.$$

Thus we conclude that $R = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T}R(T) = \{(4, 4)\}$. This example shows that elements of R may not even be weakly Pareto efficient relative to payoffs in $G(1)$.

37. Example 6 shows that, unlike what it seems at first glance, the *number* of renegotiation-proof SPNE's of $G(T)$ can be smaller than the *number* of NE's of $G(1)$! Moreover, the attainable payoff profiles may not be contained in the efficient frontier of the set of feasible payoff profiles of $G(1)$. However, Krishna and Benoit show that $\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T}R(T)$ is either a singleton or it must be contained in $\text{weff}(V^*)$, the *weakly efficient frontier* of the set V^* .³⁴ (Why does renegotiation-proofness not ensure higher equilibrium payoffs for the players?)

38. **Part IV.** We now give a series applications in finance.

39. **Example 7.** (Maksimovic, 1988, *Rand JE*) There are n firms playing the Cournot game $G(1)$, and we shall consider the corresponding $G(\infty)$. Suppose that in the stage game $G(1)$, each firm gets π^c in a symmetric collusive outcome, and each gets π^{nc} in the Cournot equilibrium. Let

³⁴For a two-player game where $(u_1, u_2) \in V^*$ denote a typical payoff profile of $G(1)$, (u_1, u_2) is contained in $\text{weff}(V^*)$ if and only if there does not exist $(u'_1, u'_2) \in V^*$ such that $u'_1 > u_1$ and $u'_2 > u_2$.

π^d be the optimal profit of a firm in $G(1)$ when all the remaining $n - 1$ firms are producing the tacitly agreed collusive quantity q^c . Suppose that $r \in (0, 1)$ is the common discount rate. Suppose that each firm has a sole equityholder. In this case, the Friedman's folk theorem says that if $r < \frac{\pi^c - \pi^{nc}}{\pi^d - \pi^c}$,³⁵ then the collusive outcome can be sustained as an SPNE outcome supported by the trigger strategy.

Suppose now that at date 0 all the n firms can issue perpetual bonds. A bond is thus a constant $b > 0$ that specifies the interest payments the borrowing firm must make at each subsequent date. Show that in a symmetric equilibrium where all firms choose the same amount b at date 0, there is an upper bound on b so that the collusive SPNE can still be sustained from date 1 on, if $r < \frac{\pi^c - \pi^{nc}}{\pi^d - \pi^c}$. In fact, show that the

³⁵Note that the equilibrium incentive compatibility (or the no-unilateral-deviation) condition requires

$$\frac{\delta(\pi^c - \pi^{nc})}{1 - \delta} > \pi^d - \pi^c,$$

where $\delta = \frac{1}{1+r}$, and hence it is required that

$$r < \frac{\pi^c - \pi^{nc}}{\pi^d - \pi^c}.$$

upper bound on b in this case is³⁶

$$\max(\pi^{nc}, \pi^c - r(\pi^d - \pi^c)).$$

On the other hand, if $r \geq \frac{\pi^c - \pi^{nc}}{\pi^d - \pi^c}$, show that in a symmetric equilibrium, b cannot exceed π^{nc} .

Remark. The above has mainly assumed that the firm can only consider vanilla debt contracts. The result crucially depends on this assumption. If the contracting parties can optimally design the covenants, then the upper bound on b can be lifted. For example, the debt contract may impose restrictions on the amount of cash earnings that can be distributed as dividends, or it may put restrictions on the firm's production activities. In the above model, if the debt covenants restrict the amount of cash dividend per period to not exceed $\pi^c - b$, then with any debt level b , the firm will optimally conform to the collusive arrangement! Similarly, if the debt covenants forbid the firm to expand output beyond q^c , then any debt level b is consistent with value maximization. Hence, I do not find Maksimovic's result about a debt

³⁶If $r < \frac{\pi^c - \pi^{nc}}{\pi^d - \pi^c}$, then as verified above the collusive outcome can be sustained in an SPNE when $b = 0$ is chosen by firm i , for all i . In this case, if $b < \pi^{nc}$, then $b < \pi^c < \pi^d$, and hence the IC condition for producing the collusive output is the same as before:

$$\frac{\delta((\pi^c - b) - (\pi^{nc} - b))}{1 - \delta} > [(\pi^d - b) - (\pi^c - b)].$$

Since $b < \pi^c$ apparently, if $b \geq \pi^{nc}$ instead, then $b \in [\pi^{nc}, \pi^c)$. In this latter case, if in a symmetric equilibrium all firms choose such a b at date 0, and if for the first time some firm deviates from the collusive behavior at date t , then from date $t + 1$ on it is an SPNE where all firms produce the static Nash equilibrium output and each of them obtains π^{nc} . Indeed, at date $t + 1$ no firm can fully repay its debt given that its rivals will all produce the static Nash equilibrium output, and although these firms are feeling indifferent about any output strategy, Maksimovic assumes that all firms will choose to produce the static Nash equilibrium output at date $t + 1$. Following default on debt at date $t + 1$, all firms will then be run by their creditors (as if they are all-equity firms) from date $t + 2$ on, and these reorganized firms will then produce the static Nash equilibrium output from date $t + 2$ on. The bottom line is that, for the original equityholder(s) at the deviating firm, the IC condition for conforming to the collusive behavior is $\pi^d - b \leq (\pi^c - b)(1 + \delta + \delta^2 + \dots)$, which reduces to $b < \pi^c - r(\pi^d - \pi^c)$. Clearly, when $b \geq \pi^{nc}$, a deviating firm no longer has to worry about its debt obligations due after its deviation, and this alters the incentive-compatibility condition for the collusive outcome.

upper bound very convincing. See Smith and Warner (1979, *JFE*) for an in-depth discussion of debt covenants. See also Rajan and Winton (1995, *JF*) for the strategic roles of debt covenants and collateral. Maksimovic (1988) does mention that the use of warrants and convertible debt may help lift the debt upper bound: by allowing the holders of the option-like securities to turn their securities into equity after the firm deviates from the collusive outcome, a firm convinces its rivals that it will not deviate at all. Thus issuing these option-like securities helps sustain collusion.

40. **Example 8.** (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, *JFE*) At date 0, Mr. B is the owner-manager of a firm protected by limited liability. The firm is endowed with \$50 in cash. There are two mutually exclusive investment projects available to B at date 0. Alternative 1 is a riskless project which incurs an immediate \$100 cash outflow and generates \$105 at date 1. Alternative 2 is a risky project which incurs an immediate cash outflow of \$100 and generates a random cash inflow \tilde{X} , where \tilde{X} has two equally likely outcomes, 0 and 180. Note that alternative 1 generates a positive NPV of \$5, but alternative 2 leads to an expected loss of \$10. Since taking alternative 1 is productively efficient, we assume that Mr. B will take alternative 1 whenever he feels indifferent about the two investment alternatives.

Mr. B decides to come to Mr. C for a loan of \$50. The game proceeds as follows. B offers a debt contract with face value F to C, which C can either accept or reject. If C rejects the contract, no investment is made and both B and C get zero payoffs. If C accepts the contract, then B must choose between alternative 1 and alternative 2. After the investment decision is made, the state of nature is realized, and B and C get paid according to the debt contract. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game.

Solution. First consider the subgame where F is given and the loan is made (or else the game has ended). If B chooses alternative 1, she is sure that she will get $\max(0, 105 - F)$. If B chooses alternative 2, then her payoff is random: with prob. $\frac{1}{2}$, she gets 0; and with prob. $\frac{1}{2}$, she gets $\max(180 - F, 0)$. Thus, B chooses alternative 2 over alternative 1 if and only if

$$\frac{1}{2} \cdot 0 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \max(180 - F, 0) \geq \max(105 - F, 0). \quad (1)$$

The following table summarizes the investment behavior of B given different values of F :

| F | alternative chosen |
|----------------------|--------------------|
| $\in [0, 30]$ | 1 |
| $\in (30, 105]$ | 2 |
| $\in (105, 180)$ | 2 |
| $\in [180, +\infty)$ | 1 |

Now we consider the subgame where C must decide whether to accept B's debt contract. According to the above table, B would subsequently invest in alternative 1 if and only if $F \leq 30$ or $F \geq 180$, but C is sure to lose money if she accepts any offer with $F \leq 30$ or with B choosing alternative 2. Thus, C accepts B's offer if and only if $F \geq 180$. Now consider B's problem of making an offer to C. Given the above analysis, B can expect her offer to be accepted by C only if $F \geq 180$, but B would be better off giving up the new investment and keeping her 50 dollars at hand.

Our conclusion is that, in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, B does not make any offers to C in the first place, and the game ends at the very beginning with the firm passing on the good investment opportunity (alternative 1).

This kind of shareholders' incentive problems is referred to as *risk shifting* or *asset substitution* in the finance literature. There are other kinds of incentive problems involving shareholders or creditors which we shall review later on. These incentive problems lead to investment inefficiencies and hence reductions in firm value.

Remarks. Implicitly assumed in the above extensive game is that B's investment decision cannot be *observed* by C, or it can be observed by C but cannot be *verified* by the contract enforcer (usually the court of law). For if the choice of the investment alternative is both *observable and verifiable* (which will be referred to as *contractible*), then B can sign a contract with C saying that B will choose the riskless project, or else C can, say, break B's arms. This is called a *forcing contract*,

which apparently removes the agency problem, as long as B cares enough about his arms. The problem is then, “Why can’t C observe B’s investment decision?” One may argue that, B, as the CEO, makes the decision in his office, and may not be observed by C. The problem is more delicate than that! Note that if ex-post cash flows are contractible, then by observing the cash flows C can prove whether B has invested the riskless project or not, and hence a forcing contract seems possible. (Of course, breaking somebody’s arms may not be legal, and hence itself unenforceable; this could create a new problem: penalizing B in a monetary manner may not work as well as breaking arms, for B may not have enough money to implement a monetary penalty on him!) Therefore, it seems necessary to assume that the ex-post cash flows are not contractible. Alas! This is again not the end of the problem. One must then ask, “Why can’t cash flows be observable?” Is it a reasonable assumption? As we shall see, a large body of literature in optimal design of financial contracts has assumed that cash flows can be costlessly observed only by the insiders of the firm (here, B). However, it has also been assumed that by spending some money, C may be able to verify the true cash flows. Of course this money, paid to an accountant for example, is a deadweight loss, and should be by all means avoided or minimized in an optimal contract, but allowing C an opportunity to verify is indeed a more reasonable assumption. The bottom line here is that, the above conclusion that external financing leads to the asset substitution problem actually stems from the somewhat arbitrary assumption that Mr. B can only use a standard debt contract when raising funds from outside investors. If B and C are rational, they should be able to use Pareto optimal contracts, and one of them is clearly equity contract.

41. **Example 9.** (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, *JFE*) Suppose A is the owner-manager of a firm whose value is

$$V = 1 - L,$$

where $L \in [0, 1]$ is A’s on the job leisure. A has utility function $U(V, L) = V^{\frac{4}{5}}L^{\frac{1}{5}}$.

- (i) Compute the optimal leisure for A. What is the corresponding value of the firm?

(ii) Now suppose A wants to sell $\frac{1}{3}$ of his ownership to outsiders. The game proceeds as follows. A first sells his partial ownership to outsiders in exchange for money M . Then, after the transaction, A chooses his leisure L . Assume that outside investors are competitive and have perfect foresight, so that M is exactly the worth of the partial ownership they obtain in equilibrium. What is the equilibrium value of the firm? Suppose there is no portfolio effect between ownership and money for A, determine if A should make this ownership transaction in the first place. What if there is a portfolio effect?

Solution. First, part (i). Recall the following consumption problem: with constants $a, b > 0$, $a + b = 1$, and $p_x, p_y, I > 0$ given, the solution to

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{x,y} U(x, y) &= x^a y^b, \\ \text{s.t. } p_x x + p_y y &\leq I \end{aligned}$$

is simply

$$x^*(p_x, p_y, I) = \frac{aI}{p_x}, \quad y^*(p_x, p_y, I) = \frac{bI}{p_y}.$$

(The above utility function is called a Cobb-Douglas utility function.) Using this fact, we have for part (i),

$$V^* = \frac{4}{5}, \quad L^* = \frac{1}{5}.$$

That is, the firm value is $\frac{4}{5}$. In the following, we continue to denote the manager's monetary wealth by V . Consider part (ii). In the subgame where M has been given, the manager's problem is to choose L to maximize her utility. Let V be the manager's monetary wealth including the cash M . Then, the value of the firm will be

$$\frac{V - M}{\frac{2}{3}}.$$

Thus, the manager seeks to

$$\max_{V,L} V^{\frac{4}{5}} L^{\frac{1}{5}}$$

$$s.t. \frac{V - M}{\frac{2}{3}} = 1 - L.$$

Using the above result for the Cobb-Douglas utility function, we have

$$L^* = \frac{1}{5}(1 + \frac{3}{2}M).$$

Observe that two things happen here. First, the price of ownership (V) relative to leisure (L) has increased from 1 to $\frac{3}{2}$. Second, before choosing the optimal L , the manager has received M (as part of his V), which implies by the concavity of U in V that L has become more desirable than in part (i). Thus it is not surprising that $L^* > \frac{1}{5}$, where $\frac{1}{5}$ is the optimal leisure in part (i), and moreover, the difference $L^* - \frac{1}{5}$ increases with M and the fraction of ownership held by the outside investors.

Now, using backward induction, we can infer what M must be in equilibrium: With rational expectations, the M outsiders are willing to pay to the manager is exactly $\frac{1}{3}$ the value of the firm:

$$M = \frac{1}{3}(1 - L^*) = \frac{1}{3}(1 - \frac{1}{5}(1 + \frac{3}{2}M)).$$

Solving, we have

$$M^* = \frac{8}{33},$$

which implies that $L^* = \frac{3}{11}$, and the value of the firm becomes $\frac{8}{11}$ (which was originally $\frac{8}{10}$). How about the manager's utility in equilibrium? It is

$$(\frac{2}{3} \times \frac{8}{11} + \frac{8}{33})^{\frac{4}{5}} (\frac{3}{11})^{\frac{1}{5}} < (\frac{4}{5})^{\frac{4}{5}} (\frac{1}{5})^{\frac{1}{5}}.$$

This has assumed that there is no portfolio effect in the manager's utility function, and we conclude that in this case the manager will not sell the partial ownership willingly in the first place. On the other hand, if the manager considers cash different from ownership of the firm, then selling the ownership may still enhance her satisfaction. In this case, however, it is not clear if the manager will increase her on the job consumption after selling the shares.

A question comes to mind at this point: why are there so many professional managers in the real world? One possibility is that running

business takes managerial expertise, and it is costly to acquire such expertise; in particular, the initial founder of the firm may not be able to manage the firm as well as a professional manager. It is natural then for the initial founder to sell the firm to the professional manager to avoid the agency problem discussed above, but the latter may not have enough money to buy out the firm! Another possibility is that an owner-manager may be hit by liquidity shock and must sell a fraction of equity for cash. This however raises the following question, “why can’t the owner-manager borrow some money, if after all getting some cash will resolve his problem?” A likely answer is that borrowing also creates some agency costs.

These two possibilities both suggest that professional managers exist only when the equityholders are *forced* to hire them (either because of their exclusive expertise, or because the equityholders must liquidate their positions in the stock to get cash). An ingenious point is made by Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992, *Review of Financial Studies*), who suggest that professional managers may exhibit too much conservatism, which shareholders dislike, but by hiring conservative professional managers, shareholders can reduce or even remove the agency costs of debt that arises from the asset substitution problem. (Like the Chinese old saying suggests, one poison may be used as an antidote for another poison.) Thus shareholders may be *pleased* to hire professional managers, using the latter as a commitment to ensure the debtholders that the firm will not undertake projects that involve excessive risks.³⁷

42. **Example 10.** (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, *JPE*)³⁸ Consider economy E that consists of a continuum of consumers. Let the population of consumers be (normalized to) 1. At date 0, each consumer is en-

³⁷A converse story (Hart and Moore, 1995, *AER*; Stulz, 1990, *JF*) is as follows. Suppose that managers derive private benefits from *empire-building* (taking too many negative NPV projects just to keep a large corporation under their control). Debt, although it creates agency costs on its own, can be used to force the manager to disgorge the free cash flows (Jensen, 1986, *AER*). Thus debt (a poison) can be used as the antidote to the managerial incentive problem (another poison).

³⁸This exercise examines why we need a commercial bank, and why a bank’s functioning may fail because of inefficient bank runs, and inquires about the possibility of replacing the commercial bank by other financial institutions like insurance companies. It also discusses the role of deposit insurance.

dowed with one unit of consumption, which can be invested in a real investment project that generates $R > 1$ units of consumption at date 2. A consumer normally consumes at date 2, but with probability $x \in (0, 1)$, he may be hit by a liquidity shock at date 1, and in that event the consumer is forced to consume at date 1 (hence he must liquidate his investment at date 1 to get cash). Assume that if the project is terminated at date 1, it returns 1 unit of consumption. Assume that at date 1, the population of consumers who are hit by a liquidity shock is exactly x ; this is called a *no-aggregate uncertainty* assumption.³⁹

(A) At first, suppose there are no financial institutions. Then, the date-0 expected utility of a consumer is simply $xu(1) + (1 - x)u(R)$, where $u(\cdot)$ is the consumer's temporal utility function of consumption, with $u' > 0 > u''$.

(B) Now assume that the consumers can get together to form a financial institution (called a *commercial bank*), and each consumer gets to sign a deposit contract with the bank at date 0. A deposit contract is a pair of promised consumptions $\{c_1, c_2\}$ such that (1) in the event that the consumer is hit by a liquidity shock at date 1, then he receives c_1 at date 1 and nothing at date 2 from the bank (equivalently, the consumer withdraws c_1 from the bank at date 1); and (2) in the event that the consumer is not hit by a liquidity shock, then he receives nothing at date 1 but c_2 at date 2 from the bank. Such a deposit contract is called *feasible* if

$$[1 - xc_1]R = (1 - x)c_2; \tag{2}$$

that is, with x consumers withdrawing at date 1, and each taking away c_1 dollars, the bank gets to invest the rest $[1 - xc_1]$ dollars at date 1, which yields $[1 - xc_1]R$ dollars at date 2 for the rest $(1 - x)$ consumers.

A deposit contract $\{c_1^*, c_2^*\}$ is called *Pareto optimal* if it is *feasible* and it maximizes each individual's expected utility:

$$\max_{c_1, c_2} xu(c_1) + (1 - x)u(c_2).$$

³⁹Although each individual is facing the uncertainty that he might need to consume early (at date 1), and that event may occur with probability x , the entire population is sure to have x consumers who need to consume early, thus facing no uncertainty.

(i) Show that under the optimal contract, the following first-order condition must hold:

$$u'(c_1^*) = Ru'(c_2^*). \quad (3)$$

(ii) Show that if $u(c) = \log(c)$ for all consumers, then there is no need of forming the commercial bank.

(iii) Show that if for all consumers and for all c , $-\frac{cu''(c)}{u'(c)} > 1$, then the Pareto optimal deposit contract is such that $1 < c_1^* < c_2^*$. (**Hint:** Write R in terms of c_1^* and c_2^* from the *feasibility* condition, and then substitute R into the first-order condition, and then recall the fundamental theorem of calculus: if $f(\cdot)$ is continuously differentiable, then $f(x) = f(y) + \int_y^x f'(t)dt$. Now look at the first-order condition with R substituted, and let $f(x) = xu'(x)$.)

From now on, we always assume that $-\frac{cu''(c)}{u'(c)} > 1$ for all c . Suppose that at date 1 the bank cannot tell if a consumer who wants to withdraw money was really hit by a liquidity shock, but it chooses to pay c_1^* to everyone who wants to withdraw at date 1. Let f be the population of consumers who want to withdraw at date 1. Note that if $fc_1^* \leq 1$, then each withdrawer gets c_1^* ; or else, each gets $\frac{1}{f}$. (This simplifies the analysis. But in general, the bank holds a “first-come-first-serve” policy and hence the money a withdrawer can get is random.) Consumers who do not withdraw at date 1 receive $\max(0, \frac{R(1-c_1^*f)}{1-f})$ at date 2.

(iv) Show that there is a Nash equilibrium where consumers withdraw at date 1 (i.e. $f = x$) if and only if they were hit by liquidity shocks.

(v) Show that there is another Nash equilibrium where consumers all withdraw at date 1 (i.e. $f = 1$) regardless of whether or not a liquidity shock has occurred.

(vi) Now consider a *sunspot* y which takes the values 0 and 1 with probability π and $1 - \pi$. Show that it is an equilibrium that $f = x$ if $y = 0$ and $f = 1$ if $y = 1$. Call this the *sunspot banking equilibrium*. For the rest of this problem, always assume the presence of the sunspot y .

(vii) Suppose that instead of signing the deposit contract, the consumers sign an *insurance contract* with the institution (with this new contract, the institution is defined as an *insurance company*): if a consumer intends to withdraw money at date 1, then a cost $k > 0$ is spent

(to hire a private investigator for example) by the institution to see if the withdrawer was hit by a liquidity shock, and at date 1 this consumer receives c'_1 if he was hit by a liquidity shock and nothing if he was not. Let f stand for the population of consumers who receive c'_1 at date 1, and h the population of consumers who intend but fail to withdraw money at date 1. For each consumer who did not receive c'_1 at date 1, his date-2 payoff is $c'_2 = \frac{\max(0, 1 - fc'_1 - (f+h)k)R}{1-f}$. Show that in equilibrium $f = x$ and $h = 0$. Show that under the Pareto optimal insurance contract c'_1 and c'_2 satisfy

$$[1 - xk - xc'_1]R = (1 - x)c'_2; \quad (4)$$

and

$$u'(c'_1) = Ru'(c'_2). \quad (5)$$

Compare (c'_1, c'_2) to (c_1^*, c_2^*) .

(viii) Show that when k is sufficiently small, an insurance company dominates a commercial bank, and when π is sufficiently large, a commercial bank dominates an insurance company.

(ix) Suppose now that there is another economy E' , identical to E . However, we shall make several modifications. First, the investment opportunity that transforms one dollar into R dollars is available to just one economy, where $1 < R < 2$, and ex-ante it is equally likely that E and E' may have this investment opportunity. Second, the consumers in the two economies can first sign a *deposit insurance contract* before learning to which economy nature assigns the investment opportunity. After signing the contract and after knowing that their economy is endowed with the investment opportunity, the consumers in the lucky economy can then form a commercial bank and sign deposit contracts with the bank, as in the above sections (i)-(vi). The deposit insurance contract states that if E is endowed with the investment opportunity while E' is not (the same is true if E and E' are switched), and if at date 1 the bank in economy E has $f > \frac{1}{c_1^*}$ withdrawers, then each consumer in economy E' is obliged to pay $fc_1^* - 1$ to the bank of economy E . Show that under deposit insurance, withdrawing money from the bank is a weakly dominated strategy for a consumer in economy E who was not hit by a liquidity shock. Show that in equilibrium consumers in economy E' never have to pay to the bank of economy E .

(x) Can you think of any negative side of deposit insurance?

Solution. Consider questions (i)-(iii). The maximization problem in part (i) can be stated as follow:⁴⁰

$$\max_{c_1, c_2} xu(c_1) + (1-x)u(c_2)$$

subject to

$$(1-xc_1)R = (1-x)c_2$$

Equivalently, we can maximize the unconstrained function

$$f(c_1) = xu(c_1) + (1-x)u\left(\frac{(1-xc_1)R}{1-x}\right),$$

which is a strictly concave function of c_1 (because $x < 1$ and $f'' < 0$), so that its maximum appears at

$$f'(c_1^*) = 0 \Leftrightarrow u'(c_1^*) = Ru'(c_2^*).$$

In part (iii), since $R > 1$ and $u'(\cdot)$ is a strictly decreasing function (because $u'' < 0$!), we conclude that $c_2^* > c_1^*$. Now, if we replace R by $\frac{(1-x)c_2^*}{1-xc_1^*}$ in $u'(c_1^*) = Ru'(c_2^*)$ (note that $1 > xc_1^*$ because of the condition $u'(0) > \frac{u'(\frac{1}{x})}{R}$), we have the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} u'(c_1^*) &= \frac{(1-x)c_2^*}{1-xc_1^*} u'(c_2^*) \\ \Rightarrow u'(c_1^*) - xc_1^* u'(c_1^*) &= (1-x) \left\{ c_1^* u'(c_1^*) + \int_{c_1^*}^{c_2^*} [u'(t) + tu''(t)] dt \right\} \\ &< (1-x)c_1^* u'(c_1^*), \end{aligned}$$

because by assumption for all c , $-\frac{cu''(c)}{u'(c)} > 1$. It follows that, if for all c , $-\frac{cu''(c)}{u'(c)} > 1$, then we have

$$0 < u'(c_1^*)(c_1^* - 1) \Rightarrow c_1^* > 1,$$

⁴⁰The condition $u'(0) > \max(\frac{u'(\frac{1}{x})}{R}, Ru'(\frac{R}{1-x}))$ implies that the constraint $0 \leq xc_1 \leq 1$ will be automatically satisfied at optimum, and hence we can ignore this constraint.

and hence $c_2^* > c_1^* > 1$ in this case. Note that if $u(c) = \log(c)$, as in part (ii), then $u'(c) = \frac{1}{c}$. In this case we have $c_1^* = 1$ and $c_2^* = R$. Thus there is no room for welfare-improving commercial banks in this case.

Consider part (iv). Because $xc_1^* < 1$, if consumers believe that only those hit by a liquidity shock will withdraw at date 1, a consumer not hit by a liquidity shock knows that she can get $c_2^* = \frac{R(1-xc_1^*)}{(1-x)}$ if she decides to not withdraw her money from the bank at date 1, and she would otherwise get c_1^* if she chooses to withdraw at date 1. Since $c_2^* > c_1^*$, a consumer not hit by a liquidity shock at date 1 indeed will not withdraw at date 1. Thus there exists an equilibrium where consumers withdraw at date 1 if and only if they are hit by a liquidity shock at date 1.

Consider part (v). When a consumer believes that all other consumers will withdraw at date 1, she believes that she will get nothing unless she also goes withdraw her money from the bank at date 1, in the latter case she would get 1 dollar back. Thus it is an equilibrium where all consumers withdraw their money from the bank at date 1 whether or not they are hit by a liquidity shock.

Consider part (vi). Suppose that all consumers believe that the equilibrium in part (iv) will prevail when everyone sees $y = 0$, and the equilibrium in part (v) will prevail when everyone sees $y = 1$. Then, it is easy to verify that these beliefs are self-fulfilling so that the above beliefs are realized in a *sunspot equilibrium*, where the equilibrium outcome depends on the realization of y .

Consider part (vii). With the insurance contract, a withdrawer gets money only if the institution proves that she was indeed hit by a liquidity shock. Thus there is no point for those not hit by a liquidity shock to try to withdraw. This means that in equilibrium $f = x$ and $h = 0$, and it rules out inefficient bank runs that appear in the equilibrium described in part (v). However, the insurance company has committed to verify withdrawers in equilibrium, even though it knows that all withdrawers are hit by a liquidity shock. Thus insurance company incurs a deadweight verification cost, which reduces the non-withdrawers' date-2 wealth. An insurance contract is feasible if and only if $[1 - xk - xc_1']R = (1 - x)c_2'$. The Pareto optimal insurance

contract c'_1 and c'_2 must solve the following program:

$$\max_{c_1, c_2} xu(c_1) + (1-x)u(c_2)$$

subject to

$$(1-xk-xc_1)R = (1-x)c_2.$$

It can be shown that c'_1 and c'_2 satisfy $[1-xk-xc'_1]R = (1-x)c'_2$ and $u'(c'_1) = Ru'(c'_2)$.

Recall that c_1^* and c_2^* satisfy $[1-xc_1^*]R = (1-x)c_2^*$ and $u'(c_1^*) = Ru'(c_2^*)$. Using $u'(c'_1) = Ru'(c'_2)$ and $u'(c_1^*) = Ru'(c_2^*)$, we have

$$\frac{u'(c'_1)}{u'(c_1^*)} = \frac{u'(c'_2)}{u'(c_2^*)}.$$

From $[1-xk-xc'_1]R = (1-x)c'_2$ and $[1-xc_1^*]R = (1-x)c_2^*$, we obtain

$$\frac{1-x(k+c'_1)}{1-xc_1^*} = \frac{c'_2}{c_2^*}.$$

It can be verified that $c'_1 < c_1^* < c'_1+k$ and $c_2^* > c'_2$. Thus the verification cost is shared by all consumers, regardless of whether or not a consumer withdraws money at date 1.

Consider part (viii). Under the optimal deposit contract, a consumer's expected payoff is

$$\pi[xu(c_1^*) + (1-x)u(c_2^*)] + (1-\pi)u(1)$$

Under the optimal insurance contract, a consumer's expected payoff is

$$xu(c'_1) + (1-x)u(c'_2),$$

When k tends to zero, c'_1 and c'_2 approach to c_1^* and c_2^* respectively. Therefore, when k is sufficiently small, an insurance company dominates a commercial bank, and when π is sufficiently large, a commercial bank dominates an insurance company.

Consider part (ix). Under the deposit insurance, if there are y withdrawers in economy E at date 1, then the bank in economy E is left with the following amount of money for investment,⁴¹

$$1 + G(y) - yc_1^*.$$

Each non-withdrawer in economy E will then get

$$\frac{[1 + G(y) - yc_1^*]R}{1 - y} = c_2^*$$

at date 2. If such a person deviated and withdrew at date 1, then he or she received c_1^* only! Thus only those who are forced to consume at date 1 would choose to withdraw at date 1 in the presence of deposit insurance provided by the other economy. We conclude that in equilibrium, the population of withdrawers at date 1 is exactly x in economy E .

Consider part (x). Sometimes depositors withdraw money from the bank because they believe that the bank has a bad performance and is not operating in a way that is consistent with their best interest. Thus, withdrawing money is one costly way (sometimes the *only* way) to make sure that a bad bank quits the market. Under a deposit insurance contract with full coverage (such as the one in part (ix)), depositors have no incentives to withdraw money even if they believe that the bank's performance is poor. The bank managers can continue to have their own way and to reduce the value of the bank without having to fear being terminated by the runs created by monitoring depositors. These issues did not appear in the above exercise, but their importance in reality cannot be overstated.

Remarks.

(i) It is important that to get R at date 2, the investment must be made *at date 0*. For if it is feasible to invest the dollar at date 1 and

⁴¹We should make sure that people in economy E' do not default on this deposit insurance contract; that is, $G(y) \leq 1$ for all $y \in [x, 1]$. It can be readily verified that $G(x) = 0$ and $G' > 0$. Thus it suffices to check that $G(1) \leq 1$. Note that $G(1) = c_1^* - 1 < c_2^* - 1 < R - 1 < 1$, because we have assumed that $R < 2$.

get R at date 2, then the only NE involves everyone withdrawing at date 1: a consumer who is not hit by the liquidity shock can realize an arbitrage profit by withdrawing at date 1. Certainly this cannot happen in equilibrium, and hence no arbitrage will rule out the existence of banks; that is, rule out the possibility of an insurance contract that Pareto improves the no trade outcome.

(ii) This model leaves out the banker's moral hazard problems. In the presence of these problems, bank runs may have a positive function: being afraid that the monitoring depositors may withdraw their money from the bank, the banker's incentives of making bad loans can be effectively removed. Deposit insurance (discussed in class) that aims at eliminating the inefficient runs may simultaneously eliminate the possibility of efficient runs, thereby aggravating the banker's moral hazard problem.

(iii) Observe that in the above model, banks essentially play the role of insurance companies: consumers are ensured a gain in the bad state (consumption equals 1) in exchange for a fee that must be paid in the good state (consumption equals R). The difference between an insurance policy and the demand deposit is that with an insurance policy, an investigation (or in more formal terminology, *state verification*) may take place to determine if the insuree is really in the bad state, and the insuree gets paid only if the bad state does occur. It is then not surprising why runs do not occur to the insurance companies. Now, if both demand deposit and insurance policy provide insurance to the consumers, and if inefficient runs are not likely to occur with insurance policy, what is the relative advantage of demand deposit to justify its existence? One distinct feature of demand deposit offered by commercial banks is the immediacy that it allows. Nowadays one can withdraw money by visiting an ATM or do transactions on the net. Investigation by the insurance company can be costly and time-consuming and hence may not be desirable if consumption is needed immediately. In terms of this observation, the above analysis can be further generalized by including immediacy and investigation (state verification), and the optimal choice of these features helps to explain why a commercial bank

instead of an insurance company is more desirable in certain economic environments. The same line of reasoning now suggests that one also consider security innovation. What may happen if, for example, instead of forming a bank, the economy chooses to form an exchange, which then optimally designs a traded security for the public? A number of authors have published new research in this regard.

(iv) Diamond and Dybvig (1983) focus on one side of a bank's balance sheet, and the paper clarifies the efficiency role of demand deposits. Diamond and Rajan (2001)⁴² argue that it is the structure of a bank's balance sheet, i.e., the loans to difficult and illiquid entrepreneurs as the bank's assets and the demand deposits for lenders subject to liquidity shocks as the banks' liabilities, that completes a bank's efficiency role. In the absence of banks, each single lender may need to incur some costs in order to develop its own expertise so as to successfully collect repayments from a borrowing entrepreneur because of the entrepreneur's incentive problems (such as the problem of inalienable human capital, the managerial moral hazard problem, or the costly state verification problem). It is efficient to allow one lender to incur such costs and collect repayments on behalf of other lenders, but in case each lender may also be hit by a liquidity shock and hence need to liquidate its loans before the loans mature, the lender that has developed repayments-collecting expertise (the so-called relationship lender) may no longer have an incentive to use that expertise on behalf of other lenders. Diamond and Rajan argue that it is an efficient arrangement that the relationship lender becomes a banker and all other lenders hold the bank's demand deposits, threatening to create a bank run when they sense that the banker breaks his promise of collecting repayments efficiently on behalf of other lenders. Thus Diamond and Rajan show that bank run, which is a form of *financial fragility*, serves as a commitment in ensuring the bank's efficiency role—that with a bank the lenders can ultimately withdraw money when they are hit by liquidity shocks and the entrepreneurs are shielded away from those liquidity shocks. In short it is the financial fragility that allows liquidity creation. From this perspective, Diamond and Rajan argue that stabilization policies

⁴²Diamond, D., and R. Rajan, 2001, Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking, *Journal of Political Economy*, 109, 2, 287-327.

including capital requirements may dampen liquidity creation.

43. **Example 11.** (Myers, 1977, *JFE*) A growth firm may be more vulnerable to an agency problem (known as *debt overhang*) than a firm with no growth opportunities. The following is an example. A firm finances the date-0 cost $g > 0$ for its search for a valuable investment opportunity by borrowing, and it promises to repay the debtholder $F > 0$ at date 2. (The cost g can be viewed as an R&D expense.) It is known at date 0 that, some public information will arrive at date 1, which will reveal how much cash inflow the project will generate at date 2. Suppose that it is investors' common knowledge that the date-2 cash inflow is equally likely to be either 20 or 10. To generate that cash flow, an additional I dollars must be spent at date 1. However, The firm has no cash at date 1, and must issue junior debt at date 1 to raise the I dollars. Now, assume that competitive investors are all risk neutral without time preferences (recall that this implies that asset prices are all marginales). At date 1, if the state is that the date-2 cash inflow is C , then the new investor (debtholder) will get $\min(C - F, F')$ at date 2, where F' is the face value of junior debt. Thus the new investor will lend I to the firm if and only if $I \leq \min(C - F, F')$, and since $F' \geq I$, the latter condition is equivalent to $C \geq F + I$. In case

$$20 > F + I > 10 > I,$$

the new investor will refuse to lend to the firm, if $C = 10$ at date 1. Since $I < 10$, this creates a deadweight loss, and is referred to as an *agency cost* pertaining to debt.

Thus, solving the SPNE of this game, we conclude that when $20 > 2g + I > 10 > I$, then in equilibrium, $F = 2g$, so that the date-0 firm value is $\frac{1}{2}(20 - I) > g$, which justifies the firm's initial R&D effort. Note that if the firm were to have enough cash earnings at date 1, the date-0 firm value would be $\frac{1}{2}(20 - I) + \frac{1}{2}(10 - I)$.

It is not surprising that the standard debt contract is Pareto suboptimal in this example. Let us derive a Pareto optimal financial contract for the initially raised g dollars, assuming more generally that $C = 20$ and 10 with probability π and $1 - \pi$ (in the above we have assumed that

$\pi = \frac{1}{2}$). Assume correspondingly

$$20 > I + \frac{g}{\pi} > I + g > 10 > I > 0. \quad (\Theta)$$

Before solving the optimal financial contract at date 0, let us first consider the equilibrium F associated with the (asserted suboptimal) standard debt contract written at date 0. Quickly deduce that $F \leq 20 - I$. (Why?) Similarly, we claim that $F \geq 10 - I$. Thus given F , the firm can raise I at date 1 if and only if $C = 20$. Rationally expecting this, the F can be obtained by solving the zero expected profit condition of the senior debtholder:

$$\pi F = g \Rightarrow F = \frac{g}{\pi}.$$

This result is consistent with assumption (Θ) . Thus at date 0, the value of debt is exactly g , showing that trading financial assets yields zero NPV at date 0. The date-0 value of equity is then $\pi(20 - I)$. What happens at date 1? It depends on C . In case $C = 20$, then the date-1 equity value is $20 - F - I$, and the date-1 value of the senior (old) debt is F (the junior debt is fairly priced, and hence is worth I); and in case $C = 10$, then all securities are worthless.

Now we consider the Pareto optimal financial contracts at date 0. Such a contract must allow the firm to maximize its date-0 value (allowing the firm to adopt as many positive-NPV projects as possible) while allowing all investors to at least break even of the time financing is granted. Let $f(C)$ be the initial investor's payoff at date 2 when C is the date-2 cash inflow. We must look for $f(10)$ and $f(20)$ such that

$$10 - f(10) \geq I; \quad 20 - f(20) \geq I;$$

$$0 \leq f(20) \leq 20 - I; \quad 0 \leq f(10) \leq 10 - I.$$

We shall maintain the assumption that

$$0 < g \leq 20\pi + 10(1 - \pi) - I,$$

so that establishing the firm by spending g in the first place makes sense to the entrepreneur. Note that this assumption implies that

$$g - 10\pi \leq 10 - I.$$

It is easy to show that (i) if $g < 10\pi$, then

$$f(10) = 0, \quad f(20) = \frac{g}{\pi};$$

and (ii) if $g \geq 10\pi$, then

$$f(10) = g - 10\pi, \quad f(20) = 10 + g - 10\pi,$$

are optimal contracts. (There are other optimal contracts, all leading to the same date-0 value.) Compared to the long-term debt maturing at date 2, these contracts allow the date-2 repayments to the date-0 investor to be indexed by the net present value of the date-1 project. Recall that the above *debt overhang* problem occurs because the firm promises to repay the senior debtholder too much in the poor state $C = 10$. Thus, by indexing the face value of debt to the realization of C , the problem is solved; see a profound analysis based on this idea in Froot, K., D. Scharfstein, and J. Stein, 1989, LDC Debt: Forgiveness, Indexation, and Investment Incentives, *Journal of Finance*, 44, 1335-1350.

There is also a second resolution to the above debt overhang problem: at date 0, issuing a properly designed convertible bond instead of the straight bond. This will give the initial bondholder an option to convert the senior debt into a fraction α of equity right before the firm tries to raise I at date 1.

How does this work? Note that the firm fails to raise I at date 1 if and only if the senior debt was not converted and the face value of the senior debt is $F > C - I$. In this event the senior debt will also be worthless, while by converting and holding a fraction α of the equity, the senior debtholder's payoff will be strictly positive: the new investor will be happy to lend I , as he will be the sole debtholder at date 2, and will hence be sure to get back the I dollars he invests at date 1. Thus investment efficiency is attained at date 1.⁴³

⁴³The point here is to make sure that the new investor holds the senior claim at date 2, if it is known that $C = 10$ at date 1. Thus, one even simpler solution is to issue outside equity at date 0. That is, in exchange of g dollars raised at date 0, the firm gives the initial investor a fraction $\frac{g}{20\pi+10(1-\pi)-I+g}$ of equity. Can you give a story that justifies the seniority of the financial claim issued at date 0?

It remains to compute the pair (F, α) , which completely describes the CB issued at date 0. The zero expected profit condition requires only that

$$\pi F + (1 - \pi)\alpha(10 - I) = g,$$

and hence there is more than one solution. For the bondholder to optimally convert in the date-1 subgame where $C = 10$, we need $\alpha > 0$, so that $F < g$. If we do not want the initial investor to convert the bond in the state $C = 20$, then we should choose $F > \alpha(20 - I)$.

Finally, we must re-consider Myers' reasoning that leads to the debt overhang problem. At date 1, when $C = 10$, what prevents the equityholder (assuming there is only one) and the senior debtholder from renegotiating the inefficient debt contract? This is a legitimate question, for both of them will get zero if they choose to do nothing. On the other hand, imagine that the equityholder says to the senior debtholder that, "if you can just reduce the face value to $x < 10 - I$, then you know that you will receive $x > 0$ for sure at date 2 instead of getting nothing." Of course, any $x \leq 10 - I$ will do, and which $x \in [0, 10 - I]$ will actually prevail at date 1 must depend on the relative bargaining power between the equityholder and the senior debtholder, but as you can see, renegotiation *should* occur, as long as renegotiation is costless (Coase, 1937, *Economica*).

Can renegotiation be costly anyway? Imagine that the senior debt is a corporate bond diffusely held by a large number of small investors. Renegotiation can be costly, although the equityholder may have more bargaining power, in this case. On the other hand, if the initial investor is a commercial bank, then renegotiation may not be very costly, although the equityholder may not enjoy as much bargaining power as when he is faced with a large number of small creditors. Thus the type of the debt instrument (bond or bank loan) and the ownership structure of the debt (diffuse or concentrated) may both affect the possibility of ex-post renegotiation.

Notice that unlike issuing CB or outside equity, the outcome of ex-post renegotiation is not guaranteed. Both the equityholder and the initial investor must form expectations about how much they may respectively get in the stage of renegotiation, and based on these expectations, the

terms of the initial debt can be determined at date 0 (via backward induction). Although we are assuming risk neutrality for everyone in this model, it is important to notice the risk involved in the ex-post renegotiation.

44. **Example 12. (The Aghion-Bolton Contingent Control Model.⁴⁴)**

At date 0, entrepreneur E is penniless and needs to raise $K > 0$ from a competitive investor I. I is very rich, but E will remain wealth-constrained till date 2. Both of them, and others to appear in the background of this model, are risk-neutral without time preferences.

At date 2, an action $a \in A$ must be chosen, which generates a cash inflow $y(a)$ and a non-transferable private benefit $l(a)$ accruing to E alone. We assume that a is not verifiable, and hence not contractible. Assume that whenever renegotiation takes place, E can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to I.

In general, a financial contract must specify two things: the allocation of *cash flow rights*, and the allocation of *control rights* (the rights to make investment decisions on behalf of everyone).

Aghion and Bolton (1992) assume that cash flow rights are allocated via linear sharing rules: for some constants t_0, t_1 , the investor would get cash flow $y(a) - [t_0 + t_1 y(a)]$ and the entrepreneur would get cash flow $t_0 + t_1 y(a)$ plus a private benefit $l(a)$. The allocation of control rights, on the other hand, is denoted by a probability α , which represents the likelihood that the entrepreneur becomes the decision maker. (While Aghion and Bolton also allow other possibilities, here we assume that given α , E gets control with probability α and I gets control with probability $1 - \alpha$.)

Given a financial contract (t_0, t_1, α) , since the entrepreneur cares about $l(a) + t_0 + t_1 y(a)$ and the investor cares about $-t_0 + (1 - t_1)y(a)$, they tend to prefer different choices of a , and their choices would in general differ from the first-best choice of a , denoted a^* , which, by definition, maximizes $l(a) + y(a)$.

Since Aghion and Bolton allow the two people to renegotiate (t_0, t_1, α) under symmetric information when the date-1 state becomes known

⁴⁴Aghion, P., and P. Bolton, 1992, An incomplete contract approach to financial contracting, *Review of Economic Studies*, 59, 473-494.

(for simplicity we assume in the current exercise that there is only one date-1 state), the date-2 choice under entrepreneur control would ultimately become a^* (Coase's theorem!⁴⁵), but since the entrepreneur is assumed to have all bargaining power against the investor during contract renegotiation, the investor would only get the payoff under the old contract $(t_0, t_1, \alpha = 1)$, which may be too little to allow the investor to break even.⁴⁶

Under investor control, on the other hand, the penniless entrepreneur cannot afford a bribe the investor during contract renegotiation, and hence Coase's theorem fails because of the entrepreneur's wealth constraint. The investor's choice of a would typically differ from a^* . However, it is much more likely that the investor can break even.

To sum up, the investment decision under entrepreneur control (i.e., $\alpha = 1$) would always be first-best efficient, but the difficulty is that the investor may not be able to break even, and hence the investor may not even be willing to finance the project at the very beginning; and under investor control (i.e., $\alpha = 0$), the latter problem would generally disappear, but the investor's choice of a would fail to attain the first-best efficiency.

Aghion and Bolton show that in this situation the optimal solution may be a contingent control allocation—to allow the investor to have the control right for a large enough probability $1 - \alpha < 1$, just to make sure that the investor can break even and is willing to finance the project in the first place.

Now let us look at a numerical example. Since the very difficulty in Aghion and Bolton's contracting problem is to encourage the investor to finance E's project, we shall confine attention to the set of initial contracts that assign *all* the cash-flow rights to the investor. Hence an old contract in this exercise must take the form $(t_0, t_1, \alpha) = (0, 0, \alpha)$. This allows us to focus on the choice of α in the initial contract.

Assume that for two real numbers $L > 0$ and $Y > 0$,

$$l(a) = L - (a - 3)^2, \quad y(a) = Y - 10(a - 2)^2, \quad \forall a \in A = [0, +\infty).$$

⁴⁵Coase, R., 1937, The Nature of the Firm, *Economica*, 4, 386-405.

⁴⁶Note that renegotiation is about (t_0, t_1) , not about α , and hence the same decision maker would be responsible for choosing a with or without contract renegotiation!

(i) Denote the first-best action by a^* . Then it can be shown that $a^* = \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$.

(ii) Suppose that $K = Y$. Then the optimal $\alpha = \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$.

(iii) Now, suppose instead that $K = Y - 5 > 0$. Then from E's perspective, the optimal $\alpha = \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$. Under this optimal control allocation, the expected value of a chosen in equilibrium is equal to $\underline{\hspace{1cm}}$.

Solution. Consider part (i). By definition, a^* is the solution to the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{a \in A} l(a) + y(a),$$

so that

$$a^* = \frac{23}{11}.$$

Before doing parts (ii) and (iii), let us make a few observations.

- Under the date-0 contract with investor control ($\alpha = 0$), the investor would choose $a_I = 2$ at date 2, which yields $y(a_I) = Y$. Since $a_I \neq a^*$, E and I would very much like to renegotiate and replace the date-0 contract by a new contract, which hopefully can induce the investor to choose a^* over a_I . Unfortunately, by assumption, E is penniless, and hence E has no money to bribe I in order to induce I to change his mind. We conclude that the inefficient choice a_I will prevail at date 2 in this case. (Note that Coase's theorem fails in this case, because of E's wealth constraint.)⁴⁷

⁴⁷More precisely, under the old contract with $\alpha = 0$, the investor's choice would be $a_I = 2$, implying that the investor's payoff is $y(2)$ and the entrepreneur's payoff is $l(2)$. Note that

$$y(2) > y(a'), \quad \forall a' \neq 2.$$

If during contract renegotiation E recommends to I a new salary contract $t_0 + t_1 y(a)$ for E, and if under this new contract the investor would optimally choose some a' over $a_I = 2$,

- Under the date-0 contract with entrepreneur control ($\alpha = 1$), E would choose $a_E = 3$, which yields $y(a_E) = Y - 10$ for the investor. Since $a_E \neq a^*$, and since the investor is not wealth-constrained, renegotiation will take place and Coase's theorem implies that E would ultimately choose to implement a^* . Since E has all bargaining power against I during contract renegotiation, $Y - 10$ is the investor's payoff both *before* and *after* renegotiation.
- Under contingent control, y is less than or equal to $y(a_I)$ but greater than or equal to $y(a_E)$. The optimal α from the entrepreneur's perspective must solve

$$\alpha y(a_E) + [1 - \alpha]y(a_I) = K,$$

and recall from section 20 of *An Introduction to the Theory of Corporate Finance*, that such a solution may be implemented by a long-term coupon bond if financial markets are sufficiently complete. Thus *putting E and I as respectively the shareholder and the debtholder* can implement the optimal contingent control allocation.

Now, for part (ii), in the special case where $K = Y$, it is clear from the above discussions that there is only one feasible date-0 contract, which is a contract under investor control; that is, the date-0 contract must assign $\alpha = 0$.

Now, consider part (iii). The optimal α from the entrepreneur's perspective must solve

$$\alpha y(a_E) + [1 - \alpha]y(a_I) = K = Y - 5,$$

which yields

then in order that the investor is willing to accept this new contract, we must have

$$y(a') - [t_0 + t_1 y(a')] \geq y(2) > y(a'),$$

implying that $t_0 + t_1 y(a') < 0$. Now, recall that E is penniless, and hence E cannot commit to any cash outflow $t_0 + t_1 y(a')$. Thus the above renegotiation would never occur. We conclude that the investor's choice remains to be $a_I = 2$ even though E and I are given the opportunity to renegotiate their old contract.

$$\alpha = \frac{1}{2}.$$

The expected value of a chosen in equilibrium is then

$$\frac{1}{2}[a_I + a^*] = \frac{45}{22},$$

where note that it is a^* rather than a_E that is implemented under entrepreneur control.⁴⁸

⁴⁸By strictly concavity, we have

$$l\left(\frac{23}{11}\right) + y\left(\frac{23}{11}\right) > l(3) + y(3),$$

and

$$y(3) > y\left(\frac{23}{11}\right),$$

so that, under entrepreneur control, before choosing a at date 2, the entrepreneur can renegotiate with the investor about his own monetary payoff (which would be zero under the old contract signed at date 0; recall that the old contract allocates the entire $y(a)$ to the investor). Actually, it is optimal for E to offer I the following salary for E:

$$-y(3) + y(a).$$

Under the old entrepreneur-control contract, the entrepreneur will choose $a_E = 3$, so that the investor's payoff is $y(3)$. Under the new contract (if the investor has accepted E's new offer), the entrepreneur will choose a to maximize

$$l(a) + y(a) - y(3),$$

so that the entrepreneur will choose $a^* = \frac{23}{11}$, which yields for the investor the new payoff of

$$y\left(\frac{23}{11}\right) - [-y(3) + y\left(\frac{23}{11}\right)] = y(3),$$

and hence the entrepreneur can reap all the efficiency gain resulting from renegotiation. Indeed, the entrepreneur's payoff under the old entrepreneur-control contract is

$$l(3),$$

and his payoff under the new contract becomes

$$l\left(\frac{23}{11}\right) + y\left(\frac{23}{11}\right) - y(3) > l(3),$$

showing that renegotiation makes the entrepreneur strictly better off.

45. (**Example 13.**) The Hart-Moore Cash Diversion Model.⁴⁹

At date 0 an entrepreneur (E) endowed with initial wealth $w \geq 0$ needs to raise from competitive investors at least $K - w > 0$ in order to implement an investment project which will generate cash flows at dates 1 and 2 but needs an immediate outlay of K at date 0. Exactly one investor will be selected to finance the project, and we shall refer to him *the investor*, or C. Both the investor and the entrepreneur are risk-neutral without time preferences.

If $B \geq K - w$ is raised at date 0, then K must be invested (whether the entrepreneur actually makes the investment at date 0 is verifiable), but the remaining cash balance $B + w - K$ becomes unverifiable after date 0. In particular, it is not possible to put $B + w - K$ in a trust fund at date 0; otherwise, this amount would become a verifiable income at date 1, which the investor would then be able to obtain without difficulty.

After K is spent at date 0, the firm has some assets in place, which generate cash earnings y_1 at date 1, and if these assets in place are kept intact till date 2, then they will generate cash earnings y_2 at date 2. If these assets are fully liquidated at date 1, then asset sale will generate a proceeds of L . These assets can be partially liquidated at date 1 as well, and liquidation of a fraction $(1 - f)$ of the assets will generate verifiable income $(1 - f)L$ at date 1. The date-2 salvage value of these assets is zero.

The key assumption in Hart and Moore model is that cash earnings y_1 and y_2 are unverifiable, and at date t the entrepreneur can simply steal y_t away. On the other hand, the presence of the physical assets is verifiable, and liquidation of the physical assets also generates verifiable income.

In this case, the investor cannot get repayments at date 2: any cash earnings at date 2 will be taken away by the entrepreneur, regardless of the promises the entrepreneur made to the investor before date 2. The investor may however get repaid for his date-0 investments at date

⁴⁹Hart, O., and J. Moore, 1989, Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt, MIT working paper no. 520.

1, if he is given a right to sell the physical assets to generate cash at date 1. Thus in this environment a feasible financial contract is a short-term debt (with maturity equal to date 1, not date 2), which gives the creditor (the investor) a liquidation right when default takes place. A short-term debt is then represented by a pair (B, \hat{P}) , where \hat{P} is the face value of the debt, and B is the date-0 amount of money that the investor lends to the firm (which is also the date-0 price of the debt, because the investor must break even at date 0), and if the entrepreneur fails to fully repay \hat{P} at date 1, the debtholder is allowed to sell as much the physical assets as needed in order to minimize his loss.

Hart and Moore assume initially that y_1 and y_2 are non-random, and although y_1 and y_2 cannot be verified in the court of law, y_t can be observed by the investor and the entrepreneur at date t . It is also assumed that

$$y_2 > L, \quad y_1 + y_2 > K \geq L.$$

The first inequality says that date-1 liquidation of physical assets is inefficient. The second inequality says that the investment project has a positive NPV, but liquidation would result in a sure loss.

Now, let us derive the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the above Hart-Moore model. First consider the date-1 subgame, where both parties have seen y_1 and the entrepreneur must decide whether to fully repay \hat{P} . Hart and Moore assume that the entrepreneur can liquidate the physical assets without the investor's permission in order to repay \hat{P} . In this case, if $L \geq \hat{P}$, then the debtholder will be fully repaid: if E does not fully repay \hat{P} , C can sell the physical assets to get \hat{P} himself. On the other hand, if $\hat{P} > L$, then E will default at date 1 and then beat C down to L in the subsequent renegotiation. (Hart and Moore assume that E has all the bargaining power when renegotiation takes place.)

This implies that what the debtholder can actually receive at date 1 is

$$P \equiv \min(\hat{P}, L),$$

and we can represent the short-term debt equivalently by (B, P) .

Hart and Moore then ask, “In what form is P received?” Since $y_2 > L$, E would like to pay as much as possible of P in the form of cash income y_1 and as little as possible in the form of asset sales. E’s date-1 cash holding, which is unverifiable, is

$$B + w - K + y_1.$$

If this amount is greater than P , then there will be no asset sales. Otherwise, there will be asset sales. The remaining fraction of assets, f , which will be carried into date 2, must then satisfy

$$f = \min\left(1, 1 - \frac{1}{L}(P - B + K - w - y_1)\right).$$

Now, we can move backwards to consider the date-0 equilibrium price B of the debt. The investor buying the debt must exactly break even, and hence we have

$$P = B \Rightarrow f = \min\left(1, 1 - \frac{1}{L}(K - w - y_1)\right).$$

Recall that the actual repayment P received at date 1 by C cannot exceed L . On the other hand, in order for the firm to make the date-0 outlay K , we need

$$B \geq K - w.$$

It follows that financing is infeasible at date 0 if either

$$K - w > L,$$

or E’s IR constraint cannot be satisfied with the equilibrium f :

$$K > y_1 + f y_2 + (1 - f)L = y_1 + L + \min\left(1, 1 - \frac{1}{L}(K - w - y_1)\right)(y_2 - L).$$

When either of these two situations occurs, the firm must pass on the positive-NPV project, and we refer to this event as a kind of *ex ante inefficiency*.

Even if financing is feasible and obtained at date 0, f may be strictly less than 1 in equilibrium, which occurs if

$$K > w + y_1.$$

Since asset liquidation at date 1 is inefficient, we refer to this event as a kind of *ex post inefficiency*. We say that the firm attains *the first-best efficiency* if neither the ex-ante nor the ex-post inefficiency takes place.

Finally, note that when financing is obtained at date 0, there exists a continuum of optimal debt contracts.

Now, consider the following numerical example for the Hart-Moore cash diversion model.

(i) Suppose that $K = 90$, $w = 30$, $y_1 = 50$, $y_2 = 100$, $L = 60$. Suppose that $B = K - w$. What is the entrepreneur's equilibrium profit (which is his post-investment wealth minus w)?

(ii) Suppose that $K = 90$, $w = 30$, $y_1 = 100$, $y_2 = 65$, $L = 30$. Suppose that $B = K - w$. What is the entrepreneur's equilibrium profit (which is his post-investment wealth minus w)?

Solution. Consider part (i). The entrepreneur's equilibrium profit is equal to

$$y_1 + fy_2 + (1 - f)L - K,$$

where

$$f = \frac{y_1}{L} = \frac{5}{6},$$

and hence the entrepreneur's equilibrium profit is

$$50 + \frac{5}{6} \cdot 100 + \frac{1}{6} \cdot 60 - 90 = \frac{160}{3}.$$

Note that in equilibrium E borrows 60 at date 0 and promises to repay 60 at date 1. Then E pays the 50 of the 60 in the form of cash and the remaining 10 in the form of asset sales. Since E must liquidate part of the assets at date 1, the *ex-post efficiency* is not attained.

Consider part (ii). The project would yield 165 for an investment cost of 90, and in a first-best world where complete contracts can be signed it would be financed. However, in a second-best world with contract incompleteness it will not be. The reason is that a contribution of $K - w = 60$ is required from the investor at date 0, but the most that the investor can recover at date 1 is $L = 30$, given that the entrepreneur can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the investor during the date-1 renegotiation. Given this, the investor will refuse to finance the project at date 0. The entrepreneur's equilibrium profit is thus zero. Thus the *ex-ante efficiency* is not attained.

In part (i), inefficiency occurs because E cannot commit to hand over the second-period payoff y_2 to the investor (in return for the investor to agree not to liquidate any assets at date 1).⁵⁰ In part (ii), inefficiency occurs because E cannot commit to hand over the first-period payoff y_1 to the investor.

46. **(The Hart and Moore Cash Diversion Model with Uncertainty.)**

Suppose that in the Hart-Moore model $K = 40$ and $w = 20$, but there are two equally likely date-1 states: in state 1,

$$y_1 = 0, \quad y_2 = 40, \quad L = 40;$$

and in state 2,

$$y_1 = 0, \quad y_2 = 80, \quad L = 20.$$

⁵⁰This is the key difference between the Aghion-Bolton model and the Hart-Moore model. In Aghion and Bolton (1992), cash earnings are observable to the contracting parties and can be costlessly verified in the court of law. Thus the entrepreneur can enjoy a monetary payoff $t_0 + t_1 y(a)$, which can vary with the realized cash earnings $y(a)$. By contrast, in Hart and Moore's model, cash earnings are observable to the contracting parties, but *cannot* be verified in a court of law! Thus a financial contract can only specify for the investor a constant monetary payoff (independent of the realized cash earnings). Nonetheless, observability of cash flows allows the two parties to renegotiate the existing "constant repayment" under symmetric information. Coase's theorem implies that they would by all means choose the most efficient way to resolve their differences. Inefficiency still arises because the contract requires a repayment that fails to adapt to the realized state, and because the only way that the investor can force the entrepreneur to disgorge cash earnings is threaten to liquidate the valuable physical assets.

Recall that the debtholder (C) would not be able to get more than L at date 1, and hence there is no point to set $\hat{P} > 40$. There are two alternatives to consider then. Either $\hat{P} \leq 20$ so that the debt is default-free, or $20 < \hat{P} \leq 40$ so that the debt is risky.

(i) Consider the optimal riskless debt contract. Under this debt contract, $3 + f = \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ in state 1, and $f - 3 = \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ in state 2. Moreover, E's payoff under the optimal riskless debt contract is equal to $\underline{\hspace{1cm}}$.

(ii) Consider the optimal risky debt contract. Under this debt contract, $\hat{P} + B = \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$, $f - 2 = \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ in state 1, and $8 + f = \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ in state 2. Moreover, E's payoff is equal to $\underline{\hspace{1cm}}$.

(iii) We have assumed so far that the date-1 state is not verifiable. Now let us assume instead that the date-1 state s is contractible, although the amounts y_1, y_2 , and L in state s remain unverifiable. In this case, a feasible debt contract is a triple $(B, \hat{P}_1, \hat{P}_2)$, where \hat{P}_s is the face value of debt contingent on the date-1 state being s .⁵¹ Verify that the following debt contract

$$(B, \hat{P}_1, \hat{P}_2) = (20, 40, 0)$$

attains the first-best investment efficiency and is hence one optimal debt contract in the current context.

Solution. Let $s \in \{1, 2\}$ denote the date-1 state, and L_s the date-1 full liquidation value of physical assets in state s , so that

$$L_1 = 40, \quad L_2 = 20.$$

Let $1 - f_s$ be the fraction of date-1 physical assets to be liquidated in state s .

Consider part (i). Recall that riskless debt is default-free, in the sense that the promised amount \hat{P} will be fully repaid in both date-1 states. Thus under a feasible *riskless* debt, we have $\hat{P} \leq \min(L_1, L_2) = 20$. By

⁵¹In case s represents a realized term structure of interest rate, then a feasible debt contract looks just like a floating-rate bond.

lending the amount $B \geq K - w = 20$ to the firm at date 0, C's payoff must be non-negative, implying that $\hat{P} \geq B$. It follows that⁵²

$$20 \geq \hat{P} \geq B \geq 20 \Rightarrow \hat{P} = B = 20.$$

Under this contract (B, \hat{P}) , liquidation of physical assets at date 1 is inevitable because of $y_1 = 0$ in both states. More precisely, a fraction $1 - f_1 = \frac{\hat{P}}{L_1} = \frac{1}{2}$ of physical assets must be liquidated in state 1 (so that $f_1 = \frac{1}{2}$), and the entire $(1 - f_2 = \frac{\hat{P}}{L_s} = 1)$ physical assets must be liquidated in state 2 (so that $f_2 = 0$). We conclude that E's payoff under the riskless debt contract $(B, \hat{P}) = (20, 20)$ is equal to

$$E[\tilde{f} \cdot \tilde{y}_2] = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \cdot 40 = 10.$$

Consider part (ii). Under the risky debt (\hat{P}, B) , default may occur in state 2. (Why not in state 1?) That is, we must have

$$20 = L_2 < \hat{P} \leq L_1 = 40,$$

and under (\hat{P}, B) , C would get \hat{P} in state 1 but only $L_2 = 20$ in state 2. For C to break even, we have

$$B = \frac{1}{2}(\hat{P} + 20) \Rightarrow \hat{P} = 2B - 20 > 20 = L_2 \Rightarrow B > 20 = K - w,$$

so that E must borrow more than $K - w$ at date 0.

Under this risky debt (\hat{P}, B) , E would have cash $B - (K - w) = B - 20$ at date 1 even though $y_1 = 0$. Note that

$$\hat{P} = 2B - 20 \leq 40 = L_1 \Rightarrow B \leq 30.$$

Thus, we have shown that any feasible risky debt (B, \hat{P}) must satisfy

$$20 < B \leq 30.$$

⁵²Note also that from the entrepreneur's perspective, C should not be left with any surplus under the *optimal* riskless debt; that is, it cannot be that $\hat{P} > B$.

Recall that under (B, \hat{P}) E would actually repay $\min(\hat{P}, L_s)$ to C in state s at date 1, and E would pay over cash first whenever possible. Note that

$$\min(\hat{P}, L_1) = \hat{P}, \quad \min(\hat{P}, L_2) = L_2.$$

Thus E needs to generate

$$\hat{P} - (B - 20) = (2B - 20) - (B - 20) = B$$

by liquidating physical assets in state 1, and to generate

$$L_2 - (B - 20) = 40 - B$$

by liquidating physical assets in state 2. Thus with the risky debt $(\hat{P}, B) = (2B - 20, B)$, we have

$$1 - f_1 = \frac{B}{L_1} = \frac{B}{40}, \quad 1 - f_2 = \frac{40 - B}{L_2} = 2 - \frac{B}{20}.$$

We conclude that E's payoff under the risky debt $(\hat{P}, B) = (2B - 20, B)$ is equal to

$$\begin{aligned} E[\tilde{f} \cdot \tilde{y}_2] &= \frac{1}{2} \left[\left(1 - \frac{B}{40}\right) \cdot 40 + \left(\frac{B}{20} - 1\right) \cdot 80 \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} [40 - B + 4B - 80] = \frac{3B}{2} - 20, \end{aligned}$$

which is increasing in B , and given that $20 < B \leq 30$, the optimal risky debt contract must have

$$B = 30 \Rightarrow \hat{P} = 2B - 20 = 40,$$

so that $f_1 = \frac{1}{4}$ and $f_2 = \frac{1}{2}$, implying that E's equilibrium payoff is equal to

$$\frac{3B}{2} - 20 = \frac{3 \cdot 30}{2} - 20 = 25.$$

Thus from E's perspective, borrowing risky debt is better than borrowing riskless debt.

Part (iii) is obvious. Intuitively, indexation allows the firm to repay more in those states where asset liquidation is less costly and less in

the remaining states where liquidation is more costly, and hence it raises the firm value.

Remarks. To capture the intuition of the above results, it is useful to make a few observations.

At first, in the current exercise, asset liquidation in state 1 is all right, because $L = y_2$ in state 1. An optimal contract should try to avoid asset liquidation in state 2, because y_2 is way larger than L in state 2.

Second, as L is larger in state 1 than in state 2, one more dollar at hand at date 1 would be more useful to raise f in state 2 than in state 1.

Third, borrowing more than the date-0 net investment outlay $K - w$ results in a higher face value of debt, \hat{P} , and \hat{P} would increase faster than an increase in B .⁵³ With $L_2 \leq \hat{P} \leq L_1$, an increase in \hat{P} would raise $\min(\hat{P}, L_1) = \hat{P}$ without changing $\min(\hat{P}, L_2) = L_2$. In other words, borrowing more at date 0 raises the debt repayment only in state 1, but the extra money borrowed can then be used to repay the creditor in state 2, where the state-2 repayment is essentially fixed at $L_2 = 20$. Thus raising \hat{P} to beyond the state-2 L would lead to a smaller f in state 1, which is all right, but it would also lead to a higher f in state 2, which is exactly the desired consequence. More precisely, by raising \hat{P} from 20 to 40, and correspondingly raising B from $20 = K - w$ to $30 > K - w$, f reduces from $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$ in state 1, which is all right, but f also rises from zero to $\frac{1}{2}$ in state 2, which is wonderful!

Finally, such adjustments are not needed, if it is C and E's common knowledge at date 0 that there is only a single date-1 state. Hence it is never necessary to borrow more than $K - w$ at date 0 when there is no uncertainty regarding the date-1 state.

47. **(Example 14). (The Harris-Raviv Solution for the Hart-Moore Cash Diversion Problem.)**⁵⁴

⁵³This happens because the debt will default in state 2 (i.e., $\hat{P} > L$ in state 2), and can only be fully repaid in state 1 (i.e., $\hat{P} \leq L$ in state 1).

⁵⁴Harris, M., and A. Raviv, 1995, The Role of Games in Security Design, *Review of Financial Studies*, 8, 327-367.

Consider the following numerical example for the Hart-Moore cash diversion model:

Suppose that $K = 75$ and $w = 0$, but there are two equally likely date-1 states: in state $s = 1$,

$$y_1 = 100, y_2 = 200, L = 100;$$

and in state $s = 2$,

$$y_1 = 40, y_2 = 200, L = 50.$$

Harris and Raviv adopt the notation $T \equiv B - (K - w)$ and $F = \min(\hat{P}, L)$, and they refer to the investor and the entrepreneur (also denoted by E) as respectively the creditor and the debtor. They proceed their analysis in three steps. In Step 1, they analyze the optimal s -indexed debt contract, assuming that s is contractible. They then assume that s is not contractible in Step 2 and Step 3. In Step 2, they analyze how assigning all the bargaining power to one contracting party during debt renegotiation may affect asset liquidation and E's payoff. Then, in step 3, they analyze how the debt contract should specify optimally the cash repayment and the amount of asset liquidation as a function of the contracting parties' reports about s in a so-called "message game."

Step 1. The authors first look for the optimal s -indexed debt contract, or the state-dependent debt contract, denoted by (T, F_1, F_2) .

- At first, can there be a feasible contract that induces no liquidation in either state?

If there is one such (T, F_1, F_2) , then the contract must satisfy

$$T + 100 \geq F_1, T + 40 \geq F_2,$$

$$T + 100 - F_1 + 200 \geq T + 100, T + 40 - F_2 + 200 \geq T + 40,$$

where the first two inequalities ensure that there is enough cash in state $s \in \{1, 2\}$ to fully repay the debt (so that asset liquidation

can be avoided in both states), and the last two inequalities ensure that the entrepreneur is willing to avoid asset liquidation by paying over cash in state $s \in \{1, 2\}$ (and hence the last two inequalities are the entrepreneur's IC constraints).

The above first two inequalities imply that

$$\frac{1}{2}(F_1 + F_2) \leq T + 70,$$

which violates the investor's individual rationality (IR) condition,

$$\frac{1}{2}(F_1 + F_2) \geq T + 75,$$

and hence no contract (T, F_1, F_2) that allows the investor to break even can avoid asset liquidation in both states.

- Thus a feasible contract must result in asset liquidation in either $s = 1$ or $s = 2$. Apparently, liquidation is less costly in state $s = 1$. Let us look for the optimal contract that results in liquidation only in state $s = 1$. Any such contract must satisfy:

$$T + 100 < F_1, \quad T + 40 \geq F_2,$$

$$2\{100 - [F_1 - (T + 100)]\} \geq T + 100, \quad T + 40 - F_2 + 200 \geq T + 40,$$

and moreover,

$$\frac{1}{2}(F_1 + F_2) \geq T + 75.$$

It can be easily verified that at optimum the last constraint must be binding (i.e., the investor must break even). We thus search for contracts that satisfy the above constraints that maximize E's expected payoff at date 0, which is

$$\frac{1}{2} \{2\{100 - [F_1 - (T + 100)]\} + (T + 40 - F_2 + 200)\}.$$

The solution to the above constrained maximization problem is $(T^*, T^* + 110, T^* + 40)$, where T^* can be any non-negative real number. Hence $(0, 110, 40)$ is optimal.

- One can also derive the (dominated) contract that results in asset liquidation only in state $s = 2$. The corresponding maximization program is as follows.

$$\max_{(T, F_1, F_2)} \frac{1}{2} [(T + 100 - F_1 + 200) + 4(50 - [F_2 - (T + 40)])]$$

subject to

$$\begin{aligned} F_2 &> T + 40, & F_1 &\leq T + 100, \\ F_1 &\leq 200, & 3T - 4F_2 + 320 &\geq 0, \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\frac{1}{2}(F_1 + F_2) = T + 75.$$

One can show that the optimal contract takes the form of $(T^*, T^* + 100, T^* + 50)$, which incurs a 10-dollar liquidation in state $s = 2$. Apparently, this contract is worse than the optimal contract that induces liquidation only in state $s = 1$.

Harris and Raviv refer to the optimal state-dependent contract $(T, F_1, F_2) = (0, 110, 40)$ as the second-best solution: although it fails to avoid asset liquidation totally (which would be the first-best outcome), indexation has allowed the borrowing firm to minimize inefficient liquidation to the greatest extent. Note that E prefers paying over cash to getting liquidated, and liquidation is less costly in state $s = 1$. In state $s = 1$, E will then liquidate assets with 10-dollar's worth and pay 100, and in state $s = 2$, E pays F_2 in full and avoids liquidation completely. As you can verify, this contract maximizes E's welfare (or minimizes E's expected cost) while keeping the investor's ex-ante individual rationality condition binding.

Step 2. Harris and Raviv then consider the case where state-dependent contracts are infeasible. In this case, one face value F of debt must be chosen to apply to both date-1 states, and in this case at least in one state s , the date-0 chosen F would not lead to a Pareto efficient date-1 outcome. More precisely, it may happen that in some state s , given F , the entrepreneur would choose to take the cash and run away, leading to a large amount of asset liquidation, whereas there exists some new

face value of debt $F' < F$, such that under F' , the entrepreneur would be willing to pay over cash and reduce the amount of asset liquidation, and both the entrepreneur and the investor would be better off under F' .

It follows that debt renegotiation which leads to a reduction in face value of debt tends to take place under a state-independent debt contract (T, F) .

Harris and Raviv argue that it matters how renegotiation proceeds, and in Step 2 they confine attention to two special classes of date-0 contracts, one specifying that E can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the creditor during renegotiation, and the other specifying that the creditor can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to E. Harris and Raviv assume that the choice between the two renegotiation processes is contractible, and hence can be stated in the date-0 contract.

Thus a date-0 contract is a triple (i, T, F) , where i represents the contracting party who has the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other party during renegotiation at date 1. Harris and Raviv refer to (i, T, F) a *creditor-favored* debt contract if i refers to the creditor, and a *debtor-favored* debt contract if i refers to the debtor (the entrepreneur).

- Harris and Raviv show that the optimal *creditor-favored* debt contract is such that $(T, F) = (104, 200)$. This contract is immune to renegotiation in state $s = 1$, but renegotiation would occur in state $s = 2$, which involves replacing $F = 200$ by a new face value of debt, $F' = 158$.

To see what happens, first observe that if liquidation occurs in state $s = 1$, then it has to occur in state $s = 2$ also, and that no contracts can avoid liquidation in both states. Hence we should first look for a contract that results in asset liquidation only in state $s = 2$.

If such a contract exists with F' being the new face value in state $s = 2$ following renegotiation (where at this point, it remains a possibility that $F = F'$), then the creditor would offer the largest F' that satisfies

$$F \geq F', \quad F' \geq 50, \quad 4(50 - [F' - (T + 40)]) \geq T + 40,$$

where the first inequality says that in renegotiation the face value of debt cannot move up (or else it would imply more, not less, asset liquidation, so that the new outcome cannot be Pareto-improving); the second inequality says that the investor (creditor) can ensure himself a minimum payoff of $L = 50$, and he has no reason to offer $F' < L$; and the last inequality makes sure that E is willing to accept F' instead of taking $T + 40$ and running away. Thus given the existing contract (T, F) , the creditor would offer $F' = 80 + \frac{3}{4}T$ in state $s = 2$.

Now we move backward to consider E's date-0 contract choice. E seeks to

$$\max_{T, F} \frac{1}{2}[100 + T - F + 200] + \frac{1}{2}[T + 40],$$

where note that in state $s = 2$, E's payoff consists of the date-1 cash $T + 40$ only, because renegotiation would take place, but when it does E's payoff is still his payoff when there is no renegotiation, as the creditor has all the bargaining power against E during renegotiation. The constraints facing E include:

- (a) $T + 75 \leq \frac{F+F'}{2}$, which is the creditor's break-even condition, with everyone knowing that renegotiation will occur in state $s = 2$ and a new face value of debt F' will replace F , where $F' = 80 + \frac{3}{4}T$;
- (b) $F \leq 100 + T$, so that the firm is solvent in state $s = 1$;
- (c) $F \geq 40 + T$, so that the firm is not solvent in state $s = 2$;
- (d) $100 + T - F + 200 \geq 100 + T$, so that in the solvent state E will not run away with cash; and
- (e) $T + 40 \geq 4 \max(0, 50 - [F - (T + 40)])$, so that with the contract (T, F) , E would rather take the cash and run away, and that is why renegotiation will occur.

It can be shown that the creditor's break-even condition will be binding at optimum, implying that $F = 70 + \frac{5}{4}T$. Replacing F', F by respectively, $80 + \frac{3}{4}T$ and $70 + \frac{5}{4}T$, and maximizing E's date-0 payoff with respect to T subject to the remaining constraints, we have the optimal $T = 104$. It follows that $F = 200$ and $F' = 158$.

Several remarks are in order.

- (a) Why is $T > 0$ at optimum? If borrowing more than $K - w$ (that is, letting $T > 0$) is beneficial, then why do we stop at $T = 104$ instead of raising T beyond 104?

Note that during renegotiation in state $s = 2$ the creditor will make sure that E does not share the efficiency gain from renegotiation, so that E's post-renegotiation payoff is equal to E's payoff without renegotiation; i.e.,

$$4(50 - [F' - (T + 40)]) = T + 40,$$

and from this equation we see that a one-dollar increase in T would eventually lead to a $\frac{1}{4}$ -dollar reduction in the liquidation proceeds, which improves E's welfare because the creditor will simply break even in equilibrium.

On the other hand, in order that E does not want to take the cash and run away in state $s = 1$, it is necessary that $100 + T - F + 200 \geq 100 + T$, or simply, $F \leq 200$, but since $F' = 80 + \frac{3}{4}T$, in order that the creditor can break even, we must have

$$T + 75 \leq \frac{1}{2}(F + F') \leq \frac{1}{2}(200 + 80 + \frac{3T}{4}) \Rightarrow T \leq 104.$$

In other words, if T is greater than 104, and if $F \leq 200$ (so that E will not engage in strategic default in state $s = 1$), then the creditor cannot break even at date 0!

- (b) Now, let us take a closer look into the date-1 events, assuming that the entrepreneur and the investor have signed the optimal *creditor-favored* debt contract $(T, F, F') = (104, 200, 158)$ at date 0.

First consider state $s = 1$. In this state, E has cash $T + 100 = 204$ on hand, which is greater than $F = 200$, and since paying over cash is better than letting asset liquidation happen from the entrepreneur's perspective, E would choose to pay over $F = 200$ in cash under the date-0 contract $(T, F) =$

(104, 200), leading to no asset liquidation. Thus the date-1 outcome under the date-0 contract is already Pareto efficient, which implies that no renegotiation can take place.

Next, consider state $s = 2$. In state $s = 2$, E has cash $T + 40 = 144$ on hand, which is less than $F = 200$. Suppose first that renegotiation is out of the question. Then the entrepreneur has two options. He can either take the cash and run away, so that he obtains a payoff of 144, or he can try to honor the debt. Note that to honor the debt, the entrepreneur can first pay over 144 in cash, but then he still needs to come up with 56 by liquidating the physical assets. Recall that the physical assets are worth $L = 50$ in state $s = 2$. We conclude that E would take the cash and run away in state $s = 2$ in the absence of debt renegotiation. Thus in the absence of renegotiation, E's status-quo payoff is 144, and the investor's status-quo payoff is $L = 50$.

Now, we allow debt renegotiation in state $s = 2$. Since the investor has all bargaining power against E, he would offer some $F' < F$ to make sure that E's payoff is still 144 after renegotiation, and to induce E to try to honor the debt and pay over cash. That is, the optimal renegotiation offer that the investor would make to E would allow the investor to fully extract the efficiency gain generated by debt renegotiation.

Our earlier derivation shows that under the investor's new offer $F' = 158$, E would feel indifferent about honoring the debt (and we assume that E would then make this choice) and about taking the cash and running away (which generates 144 to E, as in the case of no renegotiation). Indeed, by honoring the debt, E must incur a total cost of

$$144 + (158 - 144) \times \frac{200}{50} = 200,$$

and by taking the cash and running away, E would lose y_2 completely, which is again 200.

- (c) Note that after renegotiation, E's payoff is still 144, but the investor's payoff is no longer $L = 50$; instead, it is $F' = 158$!

From the perspective of minimizing inefficient asset liquidation, we must conclude that the *creditor-favored* debt contract is very inefficient! Under a state-independent debt contract, asset liquidation tends to occur in the wrong state already,⁵⁵ and allowing the creditor to have all bargaining power during debt renegotiation only result in *too much* liquidation in state $s = 2$. To see what happens, note that during debt renegotiation the creditor would only leave $T + 40 = 144$ to E after renegotiation, which means that the firm must generate $(200 - 144)/4 = 14$ from asset liquidation during debt renegotiation, and hence a fraction $\frac{14}{50}$ of the physical assets must be liquidated in state $s = 2$.

- Now, let us consider the optimal *debtor-favored* debt contract.

We claim that that $(T, F) = (0, 100)$ is the optimal choice. To see what happens, first imagine that renegotiation is forbidden.

Given a date-0 contract (T, F) , the investor's payoff is $\min(F, 100)$ in state $s = 1$ and $\min(F, 50)$ in state $s = 2$. Hence in order for the investor to break even after lending 75 at date 0, we must have $F \geq 100$. This implies that that the investor would get 100 in state $s = 1$ and 50 in state $s = 2$. This implies that the date-0 value of debt is exactly 75 in the absence of debt renegotiation.

Now, suppose that debt renegotiation is allowed, with E having all bargaining power during renegotiation against the investor. This implies immediately that the investor would get 100 in state $s = 1$ and 50 in state $s = 2$ even after renegotiation, and hence the date-

⁵⁵Recall that under the optimal state-dependent contract $(T, F_1, F_2) = (0, 110, 40)$, only a fraction $\frac{1}{10}$ of physical assets is liquidated in state $s = 1$, and asset liquidation is totally avoided in state $s = 2$!

0 value of debt is 75. It follows that $T = 0$.

Now, given (T, F) with $T = 0$ and $F \geq 100$, let us examine the renegotiation outcome at date 1. In state $s = 1$, since E has cash $T + 100 = 100$ on hand, so that E can offer the investor $F' = L = 100$ and pay over 100 in cash, leading to no asset liquidation in state $s = 1$. In state $s = 2$, E has cash $T + 40 = 40$ on hand, so that E can offer $F' = L = 50$ and pay over 40 in cash and generate 10 from asset liquidation.

To sum up, under the optimal *debtor-favored* contract, a fraction $\frac{1}{5} < \frac{14}{50}$ of physical assets must be liquidated in state $s = 2$, which proves its superiority to the optimal *creditor-favored* contract. The intuition is that, when E has all bargaining power, E only needs to leave $L = 50$ to the investor, implying that only a smaller (than in the case of the optimal *creditor-favored* contract) fraction of physical assets need be liquidated.

Step 3. Harris and Raviv show that we can generally do better than assigning all bargaining power to one contracting party if we can formulate the date-1 debt repayment as message game (or a game form, a mechanism).

Suppose that the investor lends the firm $T + (K - w)$ on the condition that E agrees to play the following *mechanism*, referred to as M :

After both contracting parties observe s at date 1, E must first put an amount d of money in escrow, which is observed privately by E and the investor, where $0 \leq d \leq T + y_1$. Then given d , E and the investor must simultaneously choose between $\hat{s} = 1$ and $\hat{s} = 2$.

- (a) Suppose that the investor reports $\hat{s} = 1$.
- If E reports $\hat{s} = 1$, then the escrow service must deliver d dollars in cash to the investor, and a portion of physical assets must be liquidated to generate for the investor an amount $\min(L, 120 - d)$.

- If E reports $\hat{s} = 2$ instead, then the escrow service must not deliver any cash to the investor (and the cash balance d must be returned to E), but a portion of physical assets must be liquidated to generate for the investor an amount $\min(L, 100)$.

(b) Suppose that the investor reports $\hat{s} = 2$.

- If E reports $\hat{s} = 1$, then the escrow service must not deliver any cash to the investor (and the cash balance d must be returned to E), but a portion of physical assets must be liquidated to generate for the investor an amount $\min(L, 50)$.
- If E reports $\hat{s} = 2$ instead, then the escrow service must deliver $\min(50, d)$ in cash to the investor (and the remaining cash must be given back to E), but a portion of physical assets must be liquidated to generate for the investor an amount $\min[L, 50 - \min(50, d)]$.

Thus a date-0 contract can be written as (T, M) . Suppose that E and the investor have signed such a contract at date 0. Let us assume that $T = 10$ and examine the date-1 subgame.

At date 1, in state $s = 1$, given $d \in [0, T + y_1] = [0, 110]$, reporting $\hat{s} = 1$ is the investor's dominant strategy, and on the other hand, by reporting $\hat{s} = 1$ E would incur a cost of

$$d + 2 \min(100, 120 - d) = \min(200 + d, 240 - d),$$

and by reporting $\hat{s} = 2$ E would incur a cost of

$$2 \min(100, 100) = 200.$$

It follows that there is a truth-telling equilibrium where both E and the investor choose to report $\hat{s} = 1$ given d . It follows that E should put $d = 110$ in escrow in the first place, which leads to a total cost of 130. Thus under (T, M) , a fraction $\frac{120-110}{100}$ of physical assets must be liquidated.

Similarly, in state $s = 2$, given $d \in [0, T + y_1] = [0, 50]$, there is a truth-telling equilibrium where both contracting parties choose to report $\hat{s} = 2$. Indeed, if the investor announces $\hat{s} = 2$, by reporting $\hat{s} = 2$ E would incur a cost of $200 - 3d$, and by reporting $\hat{s} = 1$ E would incur a cost

of 200, whenever $d \leq 50$. Conversely, if E reports $\hat{s} = 2$, then the investor feels indifferent about reporting $\hat{s} = 1$ or reporting $\hat{s} = 2$, both generating 50 to the investor. Assuming that E and the investor would always coordinate on the truth-telling equilibrium, Harris and Raviv then conclude that E should optimally choose $d = 50$ in state $s = 2$, which leads to no liquidation in state $s = 2$.

The above example shows that under the contract (T, M) , where $T = 10$ and M is *state-independent*,⁵⁶ the equilibrium outcome is the same as the second-best solution attained by the optimal state-dependent debt contract (T, F_1, F_2) !

Harris and Raviv's conclusion is that allowing the contracting parties to carefully design a message game for ex-post renegotiation may restore the second-best efficiency attained by a state-dependent contract in a wide range of financial environments.

⁵⁶This state-independent mechanism can generate different equilibrium outcomes in different date-1 states, simply because the players have received different information before playing the message game at date 1. In the current case, they know perfectly the date-1 state before playing the same message game, and the message game is so designed to ensure that the equilibrium asset liquidation in state j mimics the second-best solution in state j .